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As social awareness and political consciousness
evolved in the nineteenth century Spanish Philippines a
need for radical change became necessary. At first,
the Filipinos requested reforms but, as their requests
went unheeded, charismatic and visionary leaders arose
from their ranks and united the masses in a more
am.bitious crusade--independence . The previously docile
population became fierce fighters successfully opposing
their former colonial masters. In retrospect, this
event was a classic example of the results of socio-
political evolution, and a forecast of Southeast Asian
history.
The Philippine revolution consisted of two
phases--the insurrection against the Spaniards, and the
revolt against the Americans. Continuity between rhe
phases was provided by an organization known as the
Hong Kong Junta. The object of this thesis is to
analyze the Junta , determine its purpose, and measure
its impact.
Chapter I will examine the period just preced-
ing the revolution. To trace the roots of the Hong
Kong Junta, it will be necessary to establish the
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motivating forces that impelled the actions and reac-
tions of the members of the Junta.
In Chapter II, the Junta itself will be
described--its formation, resources, personalities, and
objectives. On this stage and with these props, the
cast of the Junta v^ill enact their part in history.
The events that involved the Junta with the
United States will be examined in Chapter III. The
next chapter will describe the internal problems of the
Junta ^ identify the factions and deal with the exter-
nal relations of the Junta ^ specifically the
representative to the United States.
Chapter V will deal with the reorganization of
the Junta ^ indentifying its new role, following the
United States' ratification of the Paris Peace Treaty.
Conclusions will be recorded in Chapter VI, bearing
upon the interrelationship of the Junta with the
Philippine Insurrection and with revolution in general.
The special advice and guidance of Professor
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A PROLOGUE TO THE JUNTA
The awakening of the Filipino people to
national self-consciousness was a gradual process
economically, politically, and socially. As trade and
commerce increased, so did contact with foreigners.
Manila, known as the "Pearl of the Orient," flourished
as a center of trade which accelerated social sophisti-
cation on the part of the natives, particularly the
Tagalogs , inhabiting this area of central Luzon.
Spain, which had colonized the Philippine
Islands since the middle of the sixteenth century,
perhaps unwittingly contributed to the emergence of the
Filipino nationality. Spanish clergy introduced Chris-
tianity, and The worship of one God provided a common
bond for the natives. Though limited by the friars to
religious exercises characterized by conservatism,
formal education also began to expand the world of the
Filipinos. In addition, common grievances, the influx
of liberal ideas, and racial prejudice by the Spaniards
contributed to a sense of national unity.
During the nineteenth century, a new class of
Filipinos began to assert itself. As certain natives

improved their economic lot, became educated, and
intermarried v/ith the Spanish administrators or the
immigrant Chinese, they formed a middle class. Gen-
erally composed of mestizos --people of Spanish, Chinese
and Filipino ancestry, this class continued to prosper.
Affluence permitted greater opportunities, particularly
in education. The middle class was not confined to
church schooling; wealth enabled study in secular
institutions, and travel to Europe for advanced studies,
Although the educated Filipinos, called Illustrados y
theoretically came from varying economic strata, educa-
tion required money; hence the members of this class
were usually wealthy.
Spaniards constituted a small minority of the
2population, and the Illustrados could claim equal or
better professional and educational backgrounds.
Nevertheless, the Illustrados were denied access to
political and ecclesiastical positions of power or
influence because of their origins. Laws and represen-
3tation in the Spanish Cortes favored the Spaniard.
Frustrations generated by Spanish policies gradually
alienated the Illustrados as a group, forcing them to
develop their own power base.

The Itlustrados became a vehicle for the desires
of the people by transmitting grievances to the
Spaniards. This development was not entirely due to
altruism, but was also based upon the Itlustrados'
desire to defend their own interests. Perm.eated with
liberal ideas garnered from Europe and America, but
socially and politically circumscribed because of their
mixed ancestry, the iZlus trades desired a greater voice
in the politics and administration of the Philippines.
Although few in numbers and limited in support, they
naturally gravitated towards the issues of the people.
In response to iniquities suffered by the natives at the
hands of the Spaniards (who sometimes referred to the
5people as eJ2on^os--colloquial Filipino for "monkeys"),
reform became the platform of the Itlustrados
.
During the 1880s and 1890s students and intel-
lectuals began to campaign both in Spain and the
Philippines for freer government, replacement of the
Spanish friars by Filipino priests, honest administra-
tion, improvement of educational facilities, and removal
of restrictions upon the press and public opinion. The
aim was to awaken the "lethargic" and "docile" masses
and to gather support for a program of reform among
their own countrymen as well as Spanish liberals. This

campaign quickly turned into a propaganda movement,
although it remained nonviolent and legal in character.
One of the first organs of propaganda was a
fortnightly paper, La Solidaridad, founded by Graciano
Lopez Jaena in 1889 and published in Madrid. The list
of contributors to this paper could have constituted a
roster of early Filipino revolutionary heroes; e.g.,
Jose Rizal, M, H. del Pilar, Eduardo de Lete, Antonio
and Juan Luna, Jose Panganiban, Mariano Ponce, Isabelo
de los Reyes, Dominador Gomez, Pedro Paterno. Others
included liberal Spaniards in sympathy with the
Filipino cause.
The paper featured articles describing
political, social, and economic conditions in the
Philippines and news concerning other Spanish colonies.
Often authors, to protect their relatives, would use
pseudonyms, for the paper was banned and considered
seditious by Spanish authorities in the Philippines.
The paper was surreptitiously introduced into the
island colony and read furtively. Copies were passed
from hand to hand and eventually reached a considerable
portion of the populace.
The leaders of the propaganda movement desired
not only to maintain, but also to tighten, the

traditional connection between the Philippines and
Spain. This is not to say that they were oblivious to
trends. They fully appreciated the consequences if the
Spanish continued to ignore their request for reform.
Radicals anxious to take control of the movement and
determined to steer it into a violent confrontation had
. . 7joined the movement.
Jose Rizal, a young Filipino medical student
who epitomized the intellectual leadership of the
propagandists, detected the drift away from reform and
observed certain weaknesses. Seeing that La Solidari-
dad was not succeeding in its campaign to convince the
Spanish government of the need for changes, Rizal
decided to produce a more forceful vehicle. The result
was his novel Noli Me Tangere (Don't Touch Me), whose
purpose v;as to expose the sufferings of the Filipino
people and present Philippine life as it actually was.
The success of this novel prompted a second. El Fili-
busterismo , a continuation of the story of the first
novel.
To the Spanish, Rizal was warning that unless
the demands of the people were heard, the only recourse
would be violence. To the Filipinos, he was cautioning

against personal hatred and ambition, and was espousing
love of country.
To foster partiotism, Rizal formed a society
called the Liga Filipina in July, 1892. The society
floundered shortly after its formation due to Rizal 's
deportation by the Spaniards to Dapitan, a remote area
on the island of Mindanao. His Liga was temporarily
revived under Andres Bonifacio, a self-educated
reformer with radical inclinations. Apolinario Mabini,
a brilliant but physically crippled intellectual, was
appointed secretary of the supreme council. In his
words, the objectives of the society were
to contribute to the support of La Solidaridad and
the reforms it asked; to raise funds to meet the
expenses noi: only of the periodical but also of the
public meetings organized to support such reforms
. . . in brief, to have recourse to all peaceful
and legal means ....
Due to lack of support, disagreements among its
members, and a conviction on the part of its leaders
that conciliation and compromise were bringing no
results, the society was disbanded. One group was
retained, however, calling itself the Cuerpo de
Compromisarios (body of compromisers), specifically
intended to support, through a monthly contribution of
five pesos, the publication of La Solidaridad.

other forces were also at v.'ork influencing
Filipino self-consciousness. Masonry, introduced by
native reformists returning from Spain, spread through-
out Manila and the surrounding provinces. To the alarm
of the authorities, who believed that the Masons were
fostering hatred against Spain, Masonic lodges gained
in popularity. The platform of the Filipino Masons
actually rested on their desire to become Spanish
citizens. Far from hating the Spaniards, they desired
the Philippines to become a Spanish province.
In spite of their initial promise, the native
societies and the propaganda campaign were failing to
accomplish their objectives. This was due to petty
jealousies am.ong the reformers, difficulty in collecting
funds, and lack of coordination. The negative results
discouraged the reformists and thinned their ranks.
New leaders, however, were beginning to assert them-
selves in the Philippines--aggressive and fiercely
nationalistic men who were determined to change the
character of the movement. Believing it was futile to
continue a peaceful approach to reform, they began to
lay revolutionary plans.
In July, 1892, Andres Bonifacio, a spokesman
for the radical elements, formed a new society--the

K. K. K. or Katipunauy promoting violence rather than
12 . . .
conciliation. This organization had two aims: (1)
to unite the Filipinos into one nation, (2) to win
Philippine independence by means of revolution. Under
Bonifacio and Emilio Jacinto, a man with a genius for
organization, the Katipunan grew in mem.bership. Uti-
lizing the secret, ritualistic methods of the Masons,
the Katipunan required certain initiation rites final-
ized by the pacta de sangre (blood pact). Code names,
passwords, and secret sym.bols were used. Including
both men and women, the society played upon the
superstitions of The masses, impressing them with
ritualistic mysteries and secrecy, and the need for
obedience. It also served to counteract the hold of
the friars, who often used the confessional to extract
secrers from the people.
From its inception, the Katipunan was phenom-
enally successful and spread quickly throughout the
provinces of Luzon. The society had its own newspaper,
the Kalayaan, which disseminated its revolutionary
ideals. In addition, other literature designed to
incite the people was produced by the leaders of the
Katipunan, and rules of conduct were taught to the

membership. By the middle of 1896, the society had
14
recruited an estimated 100,000 members.
There were some, however, who rejected the aims
of the Katipunan. The most prominent opponent was Jose
Rizal, who condemned armed revolt. He believed the
people were unprepared, armed revolt premature. Rizal
felt that evolution, not revolution, was needed.
Eventual discovery was inevitable. The friars
discovered the secrets of the Katipunan , and reported
to the Spanish administration. This action had
several effects. It drove the organization into deeper
secrecy. In addition, it further incensed the people
against Spanish injustices and restrictions. The Span-
ish reaction of indiscriminate persecution drove the men
who preferred peaceful reform into the camp of the men
who preferred armed revolt. Perhaps most important, it
forced the hand of the rebels. Despite a severe
shortage of arms and supplies, Bonifacio insisted upon
armed resistance, and led his followers into the safety
of the hills. The discovery had forced the Katipunan
into a premature confrontation with the Spaniards.
At this point a transition from the liberal
Filipino viewpoint held by men like Rizal to the radical
views of Bonifacio was taking place. The time was ripe
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for the radical and aggressive ideas of the Katipunan
to attract some of the upper class Filipinos who had
been liberal, and part of the intelligentsia who were
impatient for accomplishments. The risks were the
same, for the Spaniards made no distinction between
liberal and radical Filipino elements.
The situation was by no means clear-cut.
Filipinos, in particular the intelligentsia, still had
strong cultural ties to Spain despite a growing sense
of patriotism based upon a Filipino rather than a
Spanish self-consciousness. Down the socioeconomic
ladder, the ties to Spain became weaker. The peasants
were much less concerned with the culture of Spain than
were the affluent mestizos . Peasant patriotism was
just beginning, based upon the more radical influences.
The Katipunan' s success is partially attrib-
utable to its appeal to the masses, for the organization
served as a social as well as a political outlet. In
some respects it replaced the church; as a popular
secret society it was timely in its appearance in oppo-
sition to the Spanish administration and particularly
1 R
the clergy. The way had been paved by the propagan-
dists, whose V7ritings had begun to seep down to the
lower classes. Efforts by the Spaniards to curtail the
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propagandists had also affected the lower classes and
further aggravated their grievances. The Katipunan
became an outlet for their frustrations and provided a
positive direction against Spanish oppression.
On August 25, 1896, the first clash between the
Katipuneros and the Spaniards took place in Bulakan
17province on Luzon. The area around Manila was the
epicenter of the revolt. The peaceful demands of the
early propagandists were now replaced by a call for
independence. In a cave in the hills of Balintawak,
Bonifacio and a band of Katipuneros coined the rallying
cry, "Long live Philippine Independence!" As they
turned from sloganeering to action, the Spaniards
responded with a reign of terror. Arrests were
indiscriminate and mere suspicion was the basis for
torture. On August 30, Ramon Blanco, the Spanish
Governor of the Philippines-, proclaimed a state of war
1
8
in the provinces surrounding Manila.
Thus began the first phase of the Philippine
revolution, the insurrection against Spain. Indepen-
dence, which would be a primary goal of the Kong Kong
Junta and the driving force behind the revolution in
its later stages, was now the ambition of only a few
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naive Tagalogs , forced into premature, violent action
19by the uncovering of their secret society.
According to historian John Foreman, the rebel
aims at that time were reflected in the cry "Long Live
2Spain: Death to the Friars!" Many of the sophis-
ticates, educated men of position who in any national
movement would have been the leaders, considered
independence an ephemeral ambition. The Katipunan and
the revolution of 1896 were not the products of the
21
upper class. There was doubt whether the Filipinos,
lacking arms, could defeat the Spaniards. Moreover, as
the possibility remained that Spain would grant
reforms, the upper class was still reluctant to
jeopardize its prominent position in the Spanish-
22
controlled Filipino society. Certainly there was a
natural sympathy for the cause of one's countrymen, but
this was not sufficient reason to risk everything.
Many well-to-do Filipinos hastened to assure the
Spanish authorities of their loyalty. They were met
2 3
with suspicion and rebuff.
Certain men of high principle and moral
integrity such as Mabini and Rizal did not take part
in the uprising of 1896. Approached by Katipunan
agents, Rizal firmly refused to approve or support
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a revolution. Even after he was arrested by the
Spaniards, Rizal continued to maintain this position,
protesting his innocence and counseling against
violence
.
Several important factors weakened the cause of
the revolutionists. First, they lacked a solid corps
of leaders and policy m.akers . Intellectuals were
missing, as were men capable of sustaining a revolution-
ary movement beyond the initial stages of violence.
Bonifacio's following of Kativunevos was small.
Bonifacio was a dedicated patriot, but he lacked the
spark necessary to attract people, to unite the various
tribes, and to enlist the aid and cooperation of the
intelligentsia. Second, the revolutionists lacked arms
and money. Against the well-equipped Spaniards, bolo
knives were poor weapons. Without funds, there was
little chance of obtaining the arms necessary for
prolonged resistance. Third, true unity still did not
exist among the people. Many had only a vague idea of
the revolutionary purpose of the leaders . Others had
visions of self aggrandizement or were motivated by
racial hatred.
Independence was a state that was glorious and
desirable, but the qualifications necessary to attain
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and sustain it were still not fully appreciated by the
common man. He could only express his need for reform.
The situation was not static, however, for forces and
events would dictate change.
The propagandists possessed a dual loyalty.
They were Filipino nationalists in the sense that they
loved their country, the Philippine Islands, and their
people. They did not consider themselves a separate
race, as the Spanish did, but a part of the Filipino
nationality. They desired improvement, recognition,
and relative equality for the people. The duality in
loyalty existed in the propagandists' strong cultural,
intellectual, and political ties to Spain. Their desire
to become a province of the homeland reflected a wish
to raise the status of the Filipino people to that of
the Spanish. The level of the Illustrados would auto-
matically be raised thereby, enabling them as the elite
among the Filipinos to join the elite among the
Spaniards
.
There was also a strong sense of idealism in
the propagandists' goal--idealistic in the sense that
they believed it was possible to evolve a common polity
24
out of different races and cultures. In view of the
fact that the Spaniards considered themselves to be the
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superior culture and vjere in fact the ruling elite in
the Philippines, it V7as too much to suppose that the
Spaniards would accept the proposed equality.
The propagandists possessed the training and
intellect to provide the revolution with direction.
Their movement, which expressed the people's need for
reform, was a stimulus to both Spaniards and Filipinos.
Serving to awaken the resentment of the people against
the Spaniards, the propagandists incited men such as
Bonifacio and Jacinto to action, first by verbalizing
their complaints, then--through frustration due to a
lack of results--provoking them to adopt more violent
means
.
The Spaniards reacted to the propagandists with
a regime of cruelty and suppression. This only served
to strengthen the resolve of the radicals to adopt
violence in lieu of compromise. The radical members
forming the Katipunan provided impetus to the revolu-
tionary movement. Whereas the propagandists lacked the
desire to risk their station and privileges, and
whereas cultural ties were too strongly oriented
tov/ards Spain, there existed no such restrictions on
the membership of the Katipunan. The lower and middle
class members of Filipino native society were more
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emotional than intellectual in their motivation. They
had little to lose in status or riglits. They had borne
the brunt of the political, ecclesiastical, and social
subjugation imposed by the Spaniards.
If the two factions--the intellectual propagan-
dists and the violent revolutionaries--could unite, the
revolutionary force would have the capacity to become a
viable movement. It was to be the action of the
Spaniards that would marry the two groups.
Governor General Blanco, at first sympathetic
towards the legitimate Filipino demands for reform,
eventually succumbed to the pressures of the Spanish
25
secret police and clergy. Spanish propaganda,
initiated by the friars and administrators in Manila,
worked against the liberal Filipinos' or Spaniards'
efforts to curtail the local insurrection. The
prisons of Manila were soon stuffed to the point of
suffocation with prisoners. Hundreds of persons were
deported without trial, sentence, warning, or apparent
justification. Others were tried and executed on the
27flimsiest of testimony.
The arrival in the Philippines of General
Polavieja, who had put down the 1890 uprising in Cuba,
signaled an increase of Spanish suppression. Sent to

17
take command of the newly arriving Spanish troops,
Polavieja was identified vjith the clergy. The harsh,
inflexible military policy he instituted resembled his
2 8tactics in Cuba.
Insensitive to the feelings of the natives, the
Spaniards crowned their blunders with the execution of
Jose Rizal, the one man who commanded the respect of
both the liberal and radical Filipino factions. Under
Polavieja, a military court tried Rizal for rebellion,
sedition, and illicit association. The secret and
siimmary method of trial was repugnant to the Filipinos,
many of whom knew Rizal was opposed to armed revolt.
Moreover, to them Rizal embodied the best of Filipino
attributes
.
Rizal represented all the poetry and imagination
in the dawning national aspirations of a poetical
people .... He was, besides, chief spokesman
of the srerner judgment of the saner element among
the people; . . . his name was a fetish among them
[the masses] . 29
On December 30, 1896, Rizal was executed. The
shots reverberated throughout the archipelago, destroy-
ing the remnants of respect for the Spaniards. By this
act, Spain had made a major contribution to unifying the
people against her. "The execution of Rizal," as John
30 - •
Foreman put it, "v;as a most impolitic act." Emilio
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Aguinaldo, a young man from rural Cavite Viejo, filled
the gap. Joining the insurgents at the beginning of
the revolt, he fought his way into prominence by
winning battles. His successes, sorely needed, provided
important psychological and military impetus to the
people.
Aguinaldo was born on March 22, 18 69. The
municipal rolls of the Spanish listed the Aguinaldo
family as mestizo sangleyes , or natives mixed with
31Chinese blood. Aguinaldo grew up as a scion of a
prominent local family, and attended the College of San
Juan de Letran in Manila. In his third year, he left
school and returned home. At a young age Aguinaldo
began to gain a reputation as a leader. First elected
Cabeza de Barangay (village head man) , at the age of
twenty-five the town officials elected him Capitan
Municipal (town mayor). Influenced by the writings of
Rizal, like most young men of his generation and class,
Aguinaldo became imbued with the spirit of nationalism.
Shortly after being elected Cabeza, Aguinaldo joined
the Masonry but, as the organization was not daring
enough, he joined the Katipunan . Given the code name
of "Magdalo ," he became active in the organization and

19
32quickly rose m rank. In time this name was applied
to Aguinaldo's faction as opposed to Bonifacio's.
Utilizing his position of Capitan Municipal as
a cover, Aguinaldo secretly opposed the Spanish. Upon
learning that his disguise had been broken, Aguinaldo
came into the open, and led the Cavite revolt on
August 31, 1896, defeating a detachment of the Spanish
guard. With a small force Aguinaldo overcame the
Spaniards in other towns and gained a reputation as a
• - 33
capable military leader.
Other individuals were also distinguishing
themselves, but it was Aguinaldo who possessed the
charisma to attract hundreds of nationalists to his
camp. A secret of his rising influence was the popular
belief that he possessed the anting -anting (talisman),
making him invulnerable. His continuing successes
34
strengthened this faith.
Bonifacio, the able organizer of the Katipunan^
lacked military skills. While he experienced a series
of defeats and a loss in popularity, the victorious
Aguinaldo was fast becoming the idol of the masses. A
split developed in the ranks of the Katipuneros , with
Aguinaldo supported by the Magdalo fdiCtxon headquartered
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at San Francisco de Malabon, and Bonifacio supported by
35the Magdiwang faction located at Imus.
Believing in a rule-or-ruin philosophy,
Bonifacio advocated extermination of the Europeans. To
the contrary, Aguinaldo insisted that he was fighting
for a cause for which he sought sympathy and moral
support from "friends of liberty" all over the world.
At Cavite, he issued a manifesto declaring the aim of
the revolution to be "Liberty and Independence," and
proposing a new government similar to that of the United
States. Bonifacio denied the need for a new govern-
ment and claimed that the Katipunan could function as a
revolutionary government directing military activities.
To resolve these differences, most of the
leaders of the revolution gathered at Tejeros, in San
Francisco de Malabon, on March 22, 18 97. Bonifacio was
present, but Aguinaldo was not. Following heated
arguments, a vote was taken. The outcome repudiated
Bonifacio's leadership; the assembly voted to replace
the Katipunan with a new revolutionary government, under
Emilio Aguinaldo as president.
Bonifacio, defiant but powerless to oppose the
majority, left Tejeros with a few loyal followers,
intent on establishing his own government. Shortly
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afterward, Bonifacio's band was attacked by Aguinaldo's
followers and Bonifacio was taken prisoner. At a
summary court-martial, Bonifacio was found guilty of
sedition, and was executed.
The circumstances of the death of Bonifacio are
clouded. Aguinaldo has claimed that it was an unfor-
tunate mistake, but others say that in order to
preserve the integrity of the revolutionary forces,
Bonifacio's death was a regrettable but necessary
political move. Mabini asserts that Bonifacio's death
was a crime attributable to Aguinaldo's personal
37
ambition overcom.ing true patriotism.
During the period following Bonifacio's death,
the revolutionary forces suffered repeated reverses.
To some extent the enthusiasm for the revolutionary
cause had been squelched by the death of Bonifacio, but
the revolution was by no means suppressed. Aguinaldo
was forced to retreat in July, 18 97, to the mountains
in Bulakan province. Here he established his head-
quarters and continued his resistance to Spain.
On November 1, 18 97, after the revolutionary
leaders had agreed to continue the v;ar at all costs,
3 8
the Biak-na-Bato Republic was proclaimed. Felix
Ferrer and Isabelo Artacho, newly appointed
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revolutionary leaders, were designated to prepare a
provisional constitution. They copied the Cuban
Revolutionary Constitution of Jimaguayu, 1895, and
39passed xt off as their own work. This became known
as the Biak-na-Bato Constitution and was signed by the
majority of the rebels. The aims of the new republic
were the separation of the Philippines from the Spanish
monarchy and the formation of an independent state.
General Fernando Primo de Rivera, the successor
to General Polavieja who had returned to Spain in poor
health, realized the prohibitive cost in money and
lives of crushing a rebellion, so far from the home-
land, by military means. Being a man of tact and
acumen, he realized the advantages of a peaceful
settlement over a lengthy and costly guerrilla
campaign. After several fruitless attempts by de
Rivera to negotiate with Aguinaldo through prominent
Spaniards, Pedro A. Paterno, an established lawyer from
Manila, volunteered to act as arbitrator. In late
1897, Paterno succeeded in negotiating an agreement
called the Pact of Biak-na-Bato, consisting of three
documents signed by the Governor General for Spain,
de Rivera, and by himself for the insurgents.
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The first document, signed on November 18,
stipulated the payment of P800,000 for surrendered
arms, and the exile of Aguinaldo and his companions to
40 . . .Hong Kong. The remittance was to be accomplished m
three installments: P400,000 in the form of a bank
draft payable in Hong Kong on Aguinaldo 's departure
from the Philippines, P200,000 when the number of arms
surrendered exceeded 700, and P200,000 after the Te
Deum was sung in the Manila Cathedral and general
amnesty had been proclaimed.
The second document, signed on December 14,
granted "an ample and general amnesty" to the rebels
and reiterated the financial arrangements of the
indemnity mentioned in the first document. The last
paragraph of the second agreement alluded to the hope
and expectation of the Filipino people that the
Spaniards would institute the desired reforms, but
nothing concrete was stipulated.
The third document, signed on December 15, 1897,
called for the payment of an additional indemnity.
Besides the P800,000 already mentioned, P900,000 was to
be distributed among the civilians victimized by the
war. The total indemnity agreed upon in the three

24
documents thus amounted to PI, 700, 000, a relatively low
price for the Spaniards to pay to end a costly
41
campaign.
On December 19, at a rebel conference held in
Biak-na-Bato , an agreement was reached to invest the
money in a business venture, the profits to be spent
educating Filipino youths. Isabelo Artacho was
appointed director of commerce, responsible for the
disbursement of funds. Artacho, the rebel general
Artemio Ricarte , and Baldomero Aguinaldo, a cousin of
Emilio, were left behind to represent the supreme
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CHAPTER II
THE DEATH OF THE PACT AND
THE BIRTH OF THE JUNTA
Once the Pact of Biak-na-Bato was concluded,
the Filipino insurgents prepared to fulfill their part
of the bargain. Accompanied by a lieutenant, Aguinaldo
traveled to the village of Saul on the Lingayen Gulf.
The journey was not characterized by sadness and
defeatism, as might have been expected, but by an
attitude of relief and thankfulness on the part of the
Filipinos as well as the Spaniards. The people lining
the road to Saul greeted Aguinaldo as a hero, while the
Spanish officials treated him as a general
.
At Saul, Aguinaldo and nineteen of his ranking
officers boarded the British steamer Uranus on
December 27, 18 97, bound for Hong Kong. Prior to the
ship's departure, Aguinaldo dispatched a message to the
Spanish Governor-General of the Philippines, Primo de
Rivera. The phraseology does not convey any notion of
continued resistance, but reveals the exiles'
optimistic acceptance of the status quo.
Those who were the Filipino rebels [said the
message], on leaving the land of their birth, send
their farewell greetings not without profound
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emotion and with tears in their eyes, leaving in the
hands of Your Excellency the guardianship of their
homes and the protection of the soil where first
they saw the light of day.
All are confident that Spain, impelled by right
and justice, will grant reforms without bloodshed
or combat, since so much blood has already stained
the soil of Luzon--blood of heroes and martyrs now
brothers in peace . Those who today offer them-
selves loyally to Spain recommend as the paternal
policy of Your Excellency a real agreement between
rights and liberty.
May God bless and keep this peace for the
honorable future of our beloved country, the
Philippines, and for the prosperity and grandeur of
the Spanish fatherland.
2
Because there was no necessity for any message,
one must conclude that Aguinaldo was initially prepared
either to respect the tenets of the Biak-na-Bato Pact,
or that this was an elaborate scheme to deceive the
Spaniards. His optimistic attitude was based upon the
Spaniards ' verbal promise of reforms referred to in
Aguinaldo 's departing message. Although such promises
were not legally binding upon the Spaniards, Aguinaldo
relied upon a native belief in Spanish pundonor , or
punctiliousness on questions of honor, to carry out the
3
verbal as well as the written terms of the pact.
The mention of reforms in the message suggests
that they were at least discussed and perhaps promised.
Such hopes had weighed heavily in the Filipino decision
to negotiate with the Spaniards at Biak-na-Bato. The
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naivete of the Filipinos in not demanding that these
promised reforms be put in writing is evident but under-
standable. There still existed strong cultural ties to
Spain, which fostered tenacious confidence in the moral
accountability of what Aguinaldo himself called the
"Spanish fatherland."
The band of exiles landed in Hong Kong on
December 31, 1897, and were met by Filipino residents
who had fled the islands after 1872 and who were now
established m the Britxsh Crown Colony. Some of the
old exiles had prospered through hard work and business
deals. Although nationalistic, however, they did not
possess the revolutionary background of the new
arrivals and were suspicious of the young idealists, to
whom they referred as "beggarly rebels." While they in
turn were suspected by Aguinaldo 's men, Aguinaldo him-
self realized the need for their support. They were
rich and possessed valuable foreign contacts; their
general adhesion to the revolutionary cause, repre-
sented by Aguinaldo, could win for the cause the
confidence and support of the wealthy in the
Philippines. Accordingly, they were not to be alien-
ated; an effort was made to cultivate them, without
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encouraging too active a participation or voice in
revolutionary planning. With the progress of events a
greater cleavage vjould occur between the two groups.
On his arrival in Hong Kong, Aguinaldo's
primary concern was the preservation of the money he
had received in accordance with the agreement. On
January 2, the first banking day of the year, Aguinaldo
deposited the PUOOjOOO in the Hong Kong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation under the name of Aguinaldo and
Company, on a time deposit yielding 4 percent inter^est.
Two days later, he withdrew half of the money and
deposited it with the Chartered Bank of India,
Australia and China at 2 percent interest with the
provision that he could withdraw P50,000 per quarter.
During the course of his transactions, Aguinaldo dis-
covered that the second and third payments, each of
P200,000, could be negotiated very profitably in the
Crown Colony at an interest rate of 8 1/2 percent;
therefore he urged his cousin Baldemero Aguinaldo, who
was left behind in Biak-na-Bato , to remit the drafts
7
without delay. The money in the bank was increased by
P18,5 8 2.S0 between January 6 and February 16, and





Two significant points are involved in these
transactions, apart from the dates of deposit. First,
the money was deposited to the credit of Aguinaldo and
Company; second, in arranging the bank transaction,
Aguinaldo described the Philippines as an interior
sovereignty (soberania interior) , established Novem-
ber 1, 1897. The initial full deposit would have
allayed any fears on the part of Aguinaldo 's companions
as to his intended disposition of the money; the sub-
sequent withdrawal gave Aguinaldo considerable financial
flexibility. While the first point limited access to
the money to Aguinaldo, the second demonstrates that
Aguinaldo did not consider that the revolutionary
government had ceased to exist. An "interior sover-
eignty" meant that its agents were concealed--the men
who administered its powers did so secretly. This was
an indication of the low value placed on the agreement
g
of Biak-na-Bato , and supports the allegation that a
scheme was formulated in the mountain retreat to
acquire arms at the expense of the Spaniards while
gaining respite from the rigors of battle.
There seems to be a contradiction to Aguinaldo 's
attitude as expressed by his departing telegram. At
the time the Pact of Biak-na-Bato was concluded, the
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Spaniards held the upper hand. Aguinaldo had no choice
but to depart the Philippines. Perhaps overcome with a
mixture of pride and respect for the Spanish culture,
he optimistically and fatalistically phrased his
farewell. There is no doubt that personally Aguinaldo
held to his dream of independence, but due to the
imposition of circumstances, he perhaps relegated his
goal of independence to a secondary or futuristic
possibility.
A strict budget was established for the exiles
and a frugal existence was -enforced by Aguinaldo.
Every expense had to be reported to Aguinaldo, who
meticulously noted the sums in his account book. The
most trivial items--a pair of shoes, a new coat--had to
be approved by the leader. For some of the men, this
was a far cry from what they expected as exiles in Hong
Kong. They were in a strange land where a foreign
tongue was spoken; they had little to do except wait
and hope for a chance to return to their homeland.
Internal quarreling--a sign of their discontent--soon
developed.
Aguinaldo had misread the intent and character
of the men he had left behind. Their trust in him and
the revolutionary cause was not as lasting as he had
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thought. The dissatisfaction manifested itself on
December 29, 18 97, two days after Aguinaldo's depar-
ture. Led by Isabelo Artacho, the rebels at Biak-na-
Bato passed a resolution which defied the departed
leaders. This attitude was the result of being left
behind with no money, while the "less meritorious" were
enjoying the use of the indemnity in Hong Kong. The
authors of the resolution felt it impossible to carry
on without alleviating their own financial plight. The
resolution proposed that the second and third install-
ments, totaling P400,000, be distributed to the most
needy insurgents.
Paciano Rizal, a respected insurgent leader,
was selected to approach the Spaniards with this new
proposal. Since the surrendering of rebels and arms
was controlled by these men, de Rivera readily acceded
13to their petition. The second installment was
quickly, if not equitably, divided among the leaders
left at Biak-na-Bato
.
Pedro Paterno informed Aguinaldo of the resolu-
tion of December 29 and of the subsequent Spanish
payment to the rebels at Biak-na-Bato. For Aguinaldo,
the situation was fast deteriorating. There was dis-
content and division among the exiles in Hong Kong,
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and open defiance of his leadership in the Philippines.
Unless countermeasures were taken, the discontent in
14Hong Kong could also turn to defiance.
With clever timing and brilliant utilization of
information received froni the Philippines, Aguinaldo
repulsed the potential threat to his leadership and to
the unity of the Junta. On February 14, 1898,
Aguinaldo called a meeting of all the exiles in Hong
Kong. They met at the Greenmount house--a sort of
headquarters that was used as a gathering place for
discussions and casual talk. He relayed to the
assemblage Paterno's message describing the resolution
of December 29. Aguinaldo then read a letter from
Lieutenant Colonel Miguel Primo de Rivera, the nephew
of the governor general, stating that the Spanish had
no intention of making the third payment "as long as
there was any revolt in the Philippines and the society
of the Katipunan was not dissolved . . . ." The letter
also dashed hopes of the return to the Philippines by
any of the exiles. Aguinaldo then announced that
Artacho was resigning as secretary of the interior and
director of commerce and was demanding reimbursement of
P508.75 for miscellaneous expenses.

37
The Hong Kong exiles reacted just as Aguinaldo
would have wished. They believed that the Spaniards and
Artacho's group were acting in bad faith. The assem-
blage agreed to repudiate the Biak-na-Bato agreement of
December 19, 1897, and authorized Aguinaldo to take
charge of the money, spending only the interest for
living expenses. While they approved Artacho's resigna-
tion, they disapproved his demands for reimbursement.
As a final act, the officials of the provisional
government formed at Biak-na-Bato were replaced by
individuals selected from the membership of the exiled
17group .
This meeting represented the first action of the
Hong Kong Junta. The reins of the provisional govern-
ment were officially, if not actually, assumed by the
rebels in Hong Kong. The Junta was no longer a pur-
poseless band of exiles awaiting the outcome of a vague
and tenuous agreement, but a concentration of serious
Filipino leaders with a relatively large sum of money.
The exiled Filipino leadership, despite their
initial display of conciliation and loyalty to Spain,
had every intention of continuing the revolt. As early
as November 3, 1897, when the peace terms of Biak-na-
Bato were being negotiated, Filipe Agoncillo, appointed
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as a representative of the revolutionists, and granted
full powers of negotiation, had approached the United
States Consul in Hong Kong, Rounseville Wildman, and
proposed an alliance. Wildman reported to Secretary of
State William R. Day: "Mr. Agoncillo offers on behalf
of his government, alliance offensive and defensive with
the United States when the United States declares war
on Spain . . . ." The Filipino, he continued, desired
arms and ammunition to be paid for "on recognition of
his government by the United States." Two provinces
and the customs house at Manila were pledged as
1
8
security. This offer was not taken seriously by the
United States State Department. If Aguinaldo and his
associates were acting in good faith with de Rivera,
they would not have authorized Agoncillo to make the
^^ 19offer.
T. Agoncillo, a Filipino historian, cites
additional evidence of insurgent intentions found in a
letter from the rebel general, Jose Alejandrino, to the
renowned Filipinologist , Ferdinand Blumentritt : "In
case peace is accepted it will only be for the money
involved which we propose to use for the purpose of pro-
20
meting immediately another decisive revolution."
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While the Junta was establishing itself in Hong
Kong, events in the Philippines were not going smoothly
for the Spanish. They were chagrined by continued
clashes with the Filipinos but, as these flare-ups
were scattered and unorganized , they were initially
attributed to tulisanes (bandits). In a gesture of
confidence, Primo de Rivera sent home 7,0 00 troops.
After all, rebels were surrendering and turning in
21their arms. Relieving his mission accomplished,
de Rivera submitted his resignation as governor-
general. His optimism was premature; forces vjere
already working against the truce. The friars, fearful
of the truce, resorted to intrigues in an attempt to
destroy the Biak-na-Bato agreement. They exploited the
administration's fear of another uprising by reporting
real and imagined native plots, and urged a harder,
more uncompromising attitude in dealings with the
natives. As time elapsed with no sign of reforms, the
general populace gradually became suspicious of Spanish
intentions. The suspicions became convictions when, in
March, the popular daily Diario de Manila was suspended
for demanding the introduction of reforms. People
began to doubt the truce and began to suspect that de
22
Rivera had duped the rebels.
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A general nervousness , especially on the part
of the Spaniards, permeated Manila. It was noticed
that former insurgents were secretly grouping. At the
same time, the desertion rate among native recruits in
the army was rising; in one case a whole company
23deserted its regiment.
The authorities , reacting with neither tact nor
gentleness, imprisoned all suspects. On March 25, the
Spaniards massacred a boisterous group of Visayan
sailors gathered in a house in Manila. The victims
were thought to be conspiring.
The uneasiness was heightened by the deteriora-
tion of Spanish-American relations. As early as
January 20, 1898, Rivera received restricted information
from the Spanish embassy in Washington. It revealed
that in the event of war with the United States, the
Philippines would be the first point of American
25 . .
attack. General Basilio Augustm, who relieved Primo
de Rivera on April 10, appealed to the Filipinos to
fight for the Spaniards, just as they had done in the
2 6
past. Although the appeal attracted some volunteers,
it was too late to organize a strong native based
militia; the insurgents were encouraged by rumors of
impending war between the United States and Spain.
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The peace between the Filipinos and the
Spaniards was soon broken. In Hong Kong, Aguinaldo
asserted that de Rivera's failure to institute the
promised reforms and pay the indemnity according to
the terms of the agreement was reason enough to nullify
the pact and resume the revolution. De Rivera retorted
that reforms were never promised and that a check for
P200,000 was turned over to his successor, for payment
to the rebels; but there is no evidence that it was
27
ever received. Perhaps the Spaniards had realized
the futility of buying I'^yalty, for they were very
aware of the activities of the exiles, who were kept
under strict surveillance by Spanish officials in Hong
V 28Kong
.
Mabini's assessment that "since both parties
were acting in bad faith, one of them could not
complain if the other broke its pledges," sums up the
29
situation. There is ample evidence of deceit and
misunderstanding on both sides but, on the part of the
Filipinos, the deceit was shrewdly planned, and could
have been even more successful had it not- been attended
by greed, jealousy, and pride.
While Spain faced an imminent confrontation
with the United States, Aguinaldo had to deal with
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Isabelo Artacho, who had journeyed to Hong Kong to
present his demands. Artacho ' s arrival in the Crown
Colony posed a problem for Aguinaldo, and caused a rift
within the ranks of the exiles. Artacho maintained
that, as director of commerce, he had the right to
dispose of the Pi+00,000 held by Aguinaldo. The latter
at first opposed the demand in silence, then flatly
refused, revealing that Artacho ' s appointment was a
ruse to deceive the Spaniards into thinking the money
30
was to be used for a commercial venture. This is
another indication of Aguinaldo 's planned double-cross
of the Spaniards , though it is obvious that only a few
of his closest associates were aware of the full
.
^ ^. 31mtentxon.
Artacho ' s demands were dangerous, as some of
the exiles were greedily anticipating a division of
the money; an accounting of the funds would have
exposed the insurgents' activities, which were contrary
to the spirit of the Filipino-Spanish truce. Infu-
riated by Aguinaldo 's obstinacy, Artacho filed suit in
the Hong Kong courts against Aguinaldo. An injunction
was issued "to restrain the defendant [Aguinaldo] and
each of them from dealing with or parting with the
32possession . . . $400,000, or any part thereof." The
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threat of exposing the Junta ' s purpose was novj very
real. Counseled by Filipe Agoncillo (his chief
advisor), Aguinaldo , Colonel Gregorio del Pilar (his
aide), and Lieutenant J. Leyba (his secretary) secretly
departed Hong Kong for Singapore under assumed names
on April 7, 1898. ^^
Prior to departing, Aguinaldo withdrew P50,000
from the bank, and handed over some signed checks to
Vito Belarmino , whom he appointed his interim successor,
advising him to spend only the interest for living
expenses. As his reason for departure, Aguinaldo said
he wanted to avoid Artacho and legal entanglements; he
let it be known--presumably to discourage Artacho from
following--that his destination was Europe and the
34United States.
The Junta was divided in its feelings . While
Artacho 's demands and accusations had found some sym-
pathetic ears, Aguinaldo 's bank withdrawal and hurried,
secret departure fueled the misgivings of the exiles.
Two cliques developed: Aguinaldo 's (the more powerful)
and Artacho ' s . "Bitter enmity," writes Ricarte , "sprang
up between these two factions which gnashed their teeth
at each other when they met , but the Spanish-American
3 5War came and both reunited in a common cause."
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Artacho was left holding an "empty bag," for
Belarmino proved just as uncooperative as Aguinaldo.
Eventually, through the mediation of several respected
members of the Junta, a meeting between Aguinaldo and
Artacho was arranged for May 9, 18 98. It vjas held in
Hong Kong at the house of a friendly fellow country-
36
man.
Artacho now promised to withdraw his claim and
to ask that the attachment on the Hong Kong and
Chartered Banks be withdrawn. But, instead of keeping
his promise, Artacho returned^'-aTid demanded PUO,000 which
Aguinaldo refused. Artacho finally settled on a sum of
P5,000, not as his share in the division of the fund,
but as "alms." Realizing a good bargain, and anxious
to be rid of Artacho, Aguinaldo gave him the P5,000. A
new crisis, the Spanish-American War, had developed; it
required Aguinaldo 's full attention. He had to be able
to move freely and to have ready access to the money
in the Hong Kong banks and time was essential. No
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THE JUNTA IN OPERATION
Prior to Aguinaldo's departure for Singapore,
the exiles had heard that war between the United States
and Spain might break out at any time. Their course of
action in case of hostilities was the subject of many
far-reaching debates. The most popular plan was to
employ the money in the Hong Kong banks for the pur-
chase of arms to resume the revolution coincident with
the outbreak of war.
As usual, opinions were varied. Some suggested
that an alliance be formed with Japan, but this was
ruled out in view of the Katipunan' s failure to enlist
Japan's aid during the first phase of the revolution.
An alliance with the United States was also rejected
on the basis of the American reaction to Agoncillo's
2
offer in late November, 18 97. Since the Junta
members assumed the Spanish-American War would be
confined to the Atlantic, direct assistance from the
3
Americans seemed unlikely. Spain's forces would be
divided by the need to defend Cuba. If Spain sent
reinforcements to the Philippines, the Junta assumed
the United States Navy would intercept them.
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The arrival of an American Naval squadron in
Hong Kong on February 17, 18 98, startled Aguinaldo and
his associates. It was only natural to connect the
rumors of war with the movement of the squadron, and
to assume that the force was on its way to Manila.
Aguinaldo was even more surprised when he received a
visit from Commander Wood, captain of the gunboat
Petrel.
^
Aguinaldo claims that this and subsequent
meetings were held on or before April 6, in behalf of
Commodore George Dewey. In their secret conversations.
Commander Wood urged Aguinaldo to return to the
Philippines, organize an army, and liberate the
country; advice, arms, and ammunition would be supplied
by the Americans. Wood also revealed American plans
to engage the Spanish Fleet in Philippine waters
.
Thereupon Aguinaldo asked Wood what the United States
would do for the Philippines.
The Commander answered that the United States was
very great and rich and did not need colonies. In
view of this, I [Aguinaldo] suggested to the
Commander how much better it would be to have an
agreement in writing, and he said that he v\'ould lay
the matter before Admiral Dewey.'
Artachc's arrival in Kong Kong interrupted the
meetings and forced Aguinaldo' s flight to Singapore.
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Aguinaldo, however, carTied with him the idea of
American aid--an idea which he nurtured and developed
in Singapore.
Upon arriving in Singapore on April 23, 1898,
Aguinaldo became the house guest of Dr. Isidore de
Santos, a fellow countryman. Although he was traveling
incognito , he was anticipated by an Englishman, Howard
W. Bray, who called at the de Santos residence on the
twenty-third, inquiring for Aguinaldo. Bray, a former
planter and businessman in the Philippines, claimed to
be an old friend of Aguinaldo, and told Dr. Santos
that the American consul general had an important
message for the insurgent leader. Bray returned that
evening and again next morning; each time de Santos
denied Aguinaldo 's presence. On a fourth visit,
Aguinaldo finally consented to see Bray, v/ho presented
an urgent invitation to meet Consul E, Spencer Pratt
of Singapore. Aguinaldo accepted, and a meeting was
arranged for the evening of the twenty-fourth at "The
Mansion," a secluded public house.
At the meeting. Bray and Lieutenant J. M.
Leyba served as interpreters, since Aguinaldo could
not speak English fluently and Pratt knew no Spanish.
From the outset it became apparent that Bray's concern
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about United States-Philippine affairs was influenced
by his personal interests, Some imply that Bray may
have interpreted so as to suggest more than Pratt had
9intended to say. Very possibly Bray's interpretations
were shaded to reflect favorably upon his own motives.
Nevertheless, Aguinaldo was a responsible leader and
must take blame or credit for any misinterpretation.
A series of meetings followed, during which
Aguinaldo and Pratt seem to have reached mutual agree-
ment. The subsequent statements of each, however,
differ as to what was said and promised. In a pamphlet
written in 1899, Aguinaldo claimed that Pratt, after
conferring with Admiral Dewey, agreed to
recognize the independence of the Philippine
government under a naval protectorate, but that
there was no necessity to put it in writing, as
the words of the admiral and the American consul
were sacred and would be fulfilled ....
Pratt also promised aid in shipping arms to the
Philippines
.
Pratt's version of his meetings with Aguinaldo
is given in a letter to Secretary of State William R.
Day, dated April 28, 1898. Supposedly, Pratt had
explained his lack of authority to speak for the
United States government, pointed out the danger of
continuing independent action, and convinced Aguinaldo
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of the expediency of cooperating with the American
fleet. No mention was made of promises of recognition
or independence. In a subsequent lettei'' dated
April 30, Pratt wrote:
The general [Aguinaldo] stated that he hoped
the United States would assume protection of the
Philippines for at least long enough to allow the
inhabitants to establish a government of their
own, in the organization of which he would desire
American advice and assistance.
These questions I told him 1 had no authority
to discuss.-*-^
After the first conference, Pratt cabled Dewey
and requested a meeting with Aguinaldo in Hong Kong to
arrange for cooperation between the insurgents and the
Americans. The commodore replied: "Tell Aguinaldo
13 . .
come soon as possible." Pratt succeeded m getting
the Filipino on his way to Hong Kong aboard the
British steamer Malacca a day later, April 26.
Pratt's enthusiasm over what he considered a
diplomatic coup, exceeded the bounds of discretion. He
allowed himself to be cajoled into addressing the
Filipino residents of Singapore, who were celebrating
the prospect of independence through American aid.
Pratt's speech was reported in the Straits Times of
Singapore, clippings of which he blithely enclosed in
his reports to the State Department. The newspaper
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openly alluded to Pratt's encouragement of the Filipino
people in their struggle for independence, and praised
him for his part in arranging the help of the United
States. Primarily in response to this reporting, the
State Department sent a letter, dated July 20, admon-
ishing that Pratt's correspondence
has occasioned a feeling of disquietude and a
doubt as to whether some of your acts may not have
borne a significance and produced an impression
which this government would feel compelled to
regret
.
The reprimand made clear that the Department of State
did not in any way sanction the views expressed in the
press clippings or the specific arrangement between
14
Pratt and Aguinaldo.
Mr. Pratt was quietly separated from the con-
sular service. His version remains the weak defense
of an over-eager and misinformed official who embar-
rassed his government. Aguinaldo 's account, whether
true or fabricated, became the basis of a subtle and
expanding propaganda campaign.
Bray, the interpreter of dubious character,
found a new patron in Aguinaldo and aligned himself
with the Filipino cause. He became an advisor to
Aguinaldo and was in frequent correspondence with the
insurgent leader. In a cablegram to the Republican
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Senator George Frisbie Hoar, an anti-imperialist from
Massachusetts, Bray asserted: "The conditions under
which Aguinaldo promised to cooperate with Dewey were
Independence under a protectorate. I ami prepared to
swear to [t]his."
Bray's testimony was never taken seriously by
the American officials, and the members of the Junta
grew to mistrust him. How much he influenced Aguinaldo
cannot be determined; however, Aguinaldo later ordered
1 R
that he be given $5,000 for his services. Evidence
strongly suggests that he was dishonest and that what
he wrote to Senator Hoar was an unscrupulous, selfish
fabrication
.
Aguinaldo knew, or his advisors should have
known, that a consul did not normally speak for the
United States, and that even the president could not
make treaties without the consent of the Senate.
Aguinaldo' s acceptance of whatever promises were made
probably sprang not from naivete or gullibility, but
from a calculated desire to promote a sympathetic
reaction and a unifying influence upon the Filipino
people, while taking advantage of an unexpected chance
to continue the revolution.
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During Aguinaldo's absence, the members of the
Junta were not idle. Senor Segismundo Moret , Spanish
minister of the colonies in 1898, later testified
before the Spanish Cortes that Navarro, the Spanish
consul in Kong Kong, had been negotiating with the
Junta regarding autonomy for the Philippines. Moret
claimed that an agreement was reached and signed; but
negotiations were abruptly terminated when the Junta
learned of the promises of aid from the United
18States. This reaction seems to have hardened the
attitude of the Spaniards towards the Filipinos and
ended any thought of granting reforms.
The prospect of a Spanish-American War and the
resurgence of unrest in the Philippines was an oppor-
tunity the Junta encouraged. One circular signed
Magdalo, Aguinaldo's code name, was apparently written
in his name while he was still in Singapore. It read:
To all the Filipino Insurgent Chiefs:
BRETHEN \_sic']: ... I request you to prepare
yourselves to fight our old enemies, and to use
all means within your power to capture their
forces, as the time is still ripe for the realiza-
tion of our aspirations for the freedom of the
country. You must go to fight without doubt,
without hesitation, and before long I will not fail
to be with you.-'-^
Other circulars presented the insurgent viewpoint with
regard to Spanish injustices.
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The Junta had reached a point beyond which
there would be no return. The members realized that
their future actions would commit them to either war or
conciliation with Spain. Primarily for the benefit of
the Spaniards, the Junta presented in April, 18 98, what
could be termed an expression of national aspirations,
establishing the minimum conditions under which they
would live:
1. "A stable government elected by the people"
2
.
Taxes to be voted on by the people
3. Freedom of thought, association, and press
4. The "religion of the natives, and of those
who may come to the country, to be scrupulously
respected"
5. Christianity to be the "symbol and solid
foundation of religious institutions, but without
coercion or imposition"
6. The maintenance of the clergy as may be
agreed upon by regional governments, municipalities, or
popular elective institutions
7. "Absolute and unconditional respect of
personal property," and recognition of exclusive rights




8. "Possession of . . . tenants [to] be
respected" without their being required to pay any
fee, rent, or tax of an oppressive character
9. Strengthening of the tenants' titles to
property by preventing the Forest Bureau from search-
ing for technicalities in titles of ownership
10. Public administration to be founded and
operated "on the basis of morality, economy and
competency, under the direction of the natives"
11. Recognition of human rights guaranteed by
a judiciary
12. "Just codes adapted to our manner of life"
and based on the principle of equality before the law
13. Growth and protection of industry by means
of subsidies, local franchises, and freedom to trade
with all nations
14. A liberal banking law, liberty of mer-
cantile societies and companies, and commercial
liberty
15. The building of roads, canals, and ports,




16. Suppression of the Guardia Civil (Civil
Guard) who trapped, tortured, and executed "so many
Filipino martyrs"
17. Introduction of a judicial and adminis-
trative police system to replace the Guardia Civil
18. Formation of a "local army, composed of
native volunteers, limited in number" to the require-
ments of public order and national defense
19. A system of public instruction, less
clerical in nature
,
providing greater attention to the
natural and positive sciences, educating females as
well as males, and under a board of instruction free
from religious overseeing
20. The founding of primary schools, high
schools, normal schools, universities, museums, public
libraries, model and experimental farms, zoological
and botanical gardens
21. Promulgation of laws on hunting, fishing,
and the preservation and utilization of natural
resources
22. Free immigration and encouragement of
colonists and foreign capitalists, the only limitations




We wish in substance, all that is just,
equitable and orderly; all that may be a means of
development, prosperity and well-being; all that
may be an effective promoting agency of morality,
of virtue and respect for the mutual rights of all
the inhabitants, in both their interior and foreign
relations . 2C
The preceding desires represented a last
attempt at reconciliation of the part of the Filipino
insurgents. Spain, however, was preoccupied with the
United States, and Cuba took precedence over the
Philippine colony, which was by now a burden to the
Crown. Spanish administrators showed open hostility
and indifference towards reform. Their lack of tact,
more than anything else, alienated the Filipinos and
21
eroded any remnants of loyalty and sympathy.
New ties were now sought by the dissidents;
the circulars advocated a transference of allegiance
to the United States. The exiles in Hong Kong, aware
of the new options available through Aguinaldo's
agreement with Pratt, prepared the people for a new
ally, urging them to cooperate with the Americans and
not to mistake them as enemies. They took pains to
explain the religious views of the United States, and
assured the natives that Americans were not anti-
Catholic and possessed an ideal form of government
which they should strive to emulate.
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Let us fight together; let us second the avenging
and humane action of the Republic of North America,
and learn from it, accepting its counsels and
prescribed forms, the manner of living in order,
peace and liberty, copying its institutions, which
are the only suitable ones for the nations which
desire to reconquer their personality in the
history of the period through which we are now
passing.
The protection of the great American Republic
will make you respected and considered by all the
legally constituted civilized powers.
"Viva the Philippines! Viva Liberty and
Justice! Viva the Great Republic of the United
States of North America! Viva President McKinley
and Rear-Admiral Dewey!"
(Signed) "La Junta Patriotica"
Hong Kong, April, 189822
On April 25, Dewey received orders to proceed
to the Philippine Islands and commence operations
against the Spanish fleet. The admiral delayed his
departure, however, as he was awaiting the arrival of
Oscar F. Williams, the United States consul in Manila,
who was bringing valuable intelligence.
While waiting for orders in Hong Kong, Dewey
became acquainted with the local Filipinos. Dewey's
subsequent testimony before a Senate Committee explains
his relationship with the Junta:
I saw these men two or three times myself. They
seemed to be all very young earnest boys. I did




As for the Filipino leader, Dewey went on to say,
".
. .1 attached so little importance to Aguinaldo
23that I did not wait for him."
At his first meeting, Dewey certainly did not
take the Filipinos seriously. Their slight builds and
youthful appearance belied their capabilities.
Describing the period just prior to his departure for
the Philippines, Dewey asserted:
They [the Filipino exiles] were bothering me. I
was getting my squadron ready for battle, and
these little men were coming on board my ship at
Hong Kong and taking a good deal of my time, and
I did not attach the slightest importance to any-
thing they could do . . . .'^'^
The American squadron weighed anchor and sailed
for Manila on April 27 , taking one representative of
the Junta ^ Jose Alejandrino, as a passenger aboard a
supply ship. Alejandrino carried the circulars
designed to prepare the people for Aguinaldo 's return
and for a fighting alliance with the Americans against
25the Spaniards
.
Several circulars were written by Jose M. Basa,
a leader among the wealthy Filipino exiles in Hong
Kong. Since Basa was influential among the wealthy
and educated in the Philippines, these documents were
expected to have great impact. Besides espousing close
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support of American forces, Basa's pamphlets suggested
annexation of the islands. "This is the best oppor-
tunity which V7e have ever had," Basa stated in one of
them,
for contriving that our country (all the Philippine
Archipelago) may be counted as another Star in the
Great Republic of the United States, great because
of its wealth, and its constitutional laws.
Now is the time to offer ourselves to that
great nation. With America we shall have develop-
ment in the broadest sense (of advancement) in
civilization
.
With America we shall be rich, civilized and
happy. 2 6
Basa's stance, however, reflected neither
Aguinaldo's policy nor that of all the members of the
Junta. Dewey's cool and superior attitude toward the
exiles was not overlooked by these sensitive men. Many
of them questioned the intentions of America and
suspected imperialism lurking behind the actions of the
United States. But because they needed American as
well as Filipino support, they prepared for the emer-
gency in a most deceitful manner.
Basa's broadsides were never disseminated.
Instead a new circular marked by his initials
(J. M. B) was prepared and distributed to convey a




. . . V7e infer that they [the Americans] are
trying to make colonies of us, although they said
they would give us independence. The Committee
\_Juntal decided it advisable to simulate belief at
the same time equipping ourselves with arms ....
A part of our forces will aid the Americans by
fighting with them in order to conceal our real
intentions, and part will be held in reserve. If
Am.erica triumphs and proposes a colony we shall
reject such offer and rise in arms. 27
Taylor suspects that this document was a
forgery, as the initials were not in Basa's hand-
writing. This suspicion is supported by Basa's sub-
sequent petitions to the United States for annexation
of the Philippines and citizenship for his family.
Probably Aguinaldo could not afford to alienate Basa
and his followers by refusing to authorize the dis-
tribution of his circulars but he could allow them to
be sent and then secretly discarded. By forging a new
document, Aguinaldo could exploit Basa's influence.
Basa vjould not discover the deceit until too late, for
2 8
he remained in Hong Kong. It was a twofold deception
of the United States and the Filipinos.
This was a period of doubt and insecurity for
Aguinaldo. He was not certain of his reception in the
Philippines. The defiance of his leadership by the
men left behind, and the rumors filtering into Hong
Kong that the people questioned his honesty and
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loyalty, were disquieting and shook his determination.
When he reached Kong Kong from Singapore he discovered,
to his dismay, that Dewey had left without him. The
hopes built up in Singapore had sailed with the
American squadron.
Aguinaldo and his companions arrived in Hong
Kong on May 1 under assumed names; only trusted members
of the Junta were allowed to know where he took up
residence. His uncertainty regarding the attitude of
his followers lay behind this secrecy. His popularity
had not increased since his departure from Hong Kong;
some of the members still accused him of deserting to
Europe v;ith their money. To try to mend the breach
Teodoro Sandico, a close friend of Aguinaldo and a
spokesman for the Junta ^ who was selected to act as
go-between, arranged a meeting for May 4.
In the meantime. Consul Rounseville Wildman,
apprised of Aguinaldo 's arrival, met the insurgent
chief and informed him that Dewey had left instructions
29
for Aguinaldo to return to the Philippines. The
news partially assuaged Aguinaldo 's disappointment over
Dewey's departure. The meeting with Wildman, like the
meeting with Pratt, is clouded by conflicting accounts.
According to Edwin Wildman, brother to the consul.
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Aguinaldo was anxious to become an American citizen
but, as this was impossible, he desired to return to
the Philippines to work for Dewey. He made no demands
for independence; indeed, he hoped the Americans would
annex the Philippines. He promised the consul he would
fight on the side of the United States and not attempt
to foment a revolution against them; he would abide by
the decision of the United States as to the final dis-
position of the Philippines. His overriding aim was
30
to throw off the Spanish yoke.
Aguinaldo claims that at the conference
. . . I talked with the Consul about the expedition
of arms which I had in mind, and we agreed that the
said Consul and the Filipino, Sr . Teodoro Sandico,
were to be left in charge of the expedition, I
turning over that same night to the said gentlemen
the sum of 50,000 pesos on deposit. 3-'-
In subsequent conferences, Wildman advised Aguinaldo
"to establish a Philippine government in a dictatorial
3 2form." He explained that it was the best system for
carrying out a war. After the war Aguinaldo could
33
establish a government based upon the American model.
Despite the assurances of Wildman, Aguinaldo
still faced the problem of setting his own house in
order; the Junta had to be united under his leadership,
and a concrete plan of action developed. The Junta
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gathered on May 4 to decide on the steps to be taken in
the wake of Dewey's victory over the Spanish fleet on
May 1, and to hear Aguinaldo's version of the con-
ferences with Pratt and Wildman.
At the Junta meeting, Filipe Agoncillo
announced Aguinaldo's arrival in Hong Kong and sug-
gested that he take over as president. After this was
agreed upon, Aguinaldo was permitted to join the con-
ference and was administered the oath of office. He
then recounted his negotiations with Pratt and Wildman,
claiming that he was not satisfied with his interviews
with the latter. In the end he requested the advice of
the Junta on the wisdom of returning to the Philip-
pines .
The arguments in favor of his return were
expressed by Sandico and Agoncillo, who stressed that
Aguinaldo's prestige was essential to the unity of the
people and that he alone could prevent dissension.
Nevertheless, Aguinaldo still balked at returning; he
feared that Dewey would force him to subscribe to
"unpatriotic proposals," and that, if he refused, the
break between them would become obvious to all.
Aguinaldo was also afraid that the American admiral
would refuse to furnish arms, without which he would be
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powerless to organize the people; the Spaniards, in
fact, vjould demand the return of the Pi400,000. Sandico
and others reassured Aguinaldo on these points, as they
were convinced the Americans would cooperate and supply
arms because they needed the help of the insurgents.
Since the Junta anticipated a possible conflict with
the United States, it considered this a good oppor-
tunity to obtain arms at the expense of the Americans
.
The members of the Junta remained adamant and
continued to press their arguments, reasoning that if
the Americans remembered the principles expressed in
their own constitution, they would neither colonize
nor annex the Philippines. The latter would probably
be given its independence, guaranteed by America. In
such a case, Aguinaldo should leave immediately, in
order to be on hand to prevent a scramble for position
among the more ambitious insurgent leaders and to
establish a suitable government. Any delay in
Aguinaldo 's return, the Junta argued, could be
attributed to a lack of patriotism and considered a
criminal weakness that would destroy the hard-won
314
reputation of the president.
The pressure was irresistible; Aguinaldo
decided to return to the Philippines. On May 7, the
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revenue cutter McCultoch arrived in Hong Kong but,
since its captain had not received instructions to
convey Aguinaldo, the insurgent chief was refused
passage. Aguinaldo 's return to the Philippines by way
of an American warship was crucial to the Junta's
plans, and important psychologically. His arrival at
Cavite, aboard a vessel that was part of the vic-
torious American fleet, would enhance his prestige and
credibility; it would support his reputation as an
unconquerable general who led a charmed life protected
35by an anting - anting
.
This action would also repre-
sent an outward show of support by the Americans for
the Filipinos, would generate confidence among the
people, and validate the theme of the circulars
previously distributed. Additionally, a bold and
dramatic homecoming backed by the armed forces of a
great nation would insure a multitude of volunteers
with which to rebuild the insurgent armies.
An important aspect of Aguinaldo 's preparations
for returning to the Philippines was the securing of
arms. For this, Aguinaldo depended upon Wildman, who
zealously took charge of the project. The consul was
initially given P50,000 for the shipment of arms to
the Philippines; before departing, Aguinaldo handed
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him an additional P67,000 to buy and ship a second
consignment
.
The first shipment of arms, consisting of 2,0 00
Mauser rifles and 200,000 cartridges, was delivered,
but the second--according to Aguinaldo, at least--was
never received. "Mr. Wildman did not comply with this
last trust, keeping the said sum of money [P67,000],
q c
which he refuses to return, according to my advices.''
Edwin Wildman 's account of the period states
only that Aguinaldo concluded arrangements to purchase
"three thousand stand of arms" in Hong Kong, which were
37landed in Cavite. The consul did not report any arms
purchases, or his dealings with the insurgents, until
3 8July 18, 1898. This may have reflected his reaction
to instructions previously received after he reported
Agoncillo's offer of alliance in November, 1897; at
that time, the State Department instructed him to
39
refuse to be the vehicle of any such offers.
On July 25, 1898, Wildman wrote Aguinaldo that
the United States had undertaken the war solely to
relieve the Cubans from the cruelties they were
suffering and not for the love of conquest or the hope
of gain. He also stated that America could be trusted
to deal with him with honor and justice. The State
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Department promptly telegraphed Wildman: "Your action
disapproved and you are forbidden to make pledges or
40dxscuss policy." Nevertheless, the consul continued
41to advise and encourage Agumaldo. Such action was
not only irregular, but also unethical. Like Pratt,
he did not seem to be attuned to the attitude of the
State Department towards the Philippines. Possibly,
as Aguinaldo suggested, he was seeking personal gain
or glory.
Once again, Aguinaldo had refused to recognize
that consuls were not diplomatic agents, and that
whatever they said in public or in private was their
own opinion and did not necessarily represent the view
of the American government. Such an interpretation,
however, suited the strategy that underlay Aguinaldo 's
fierce campaign for Filipino independence.
In mid-May, 1898, the MoCullooh returned to
Hong Kong; this time Aguinaldo was permitted passage.
Wildman made the arrangements, insisting upon stealth
and secrecy, for he wanted to avoid the suspicion of
the Spanish consul and censure by the neutral British
authorities who controlled the port. The MaCulloch
departed the British Crown Colony on the morning of
May 17, with Aguinaldo and thirteen of his followers
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and arrived at Cavite two days later. True to his
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CHAPTER IV
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY
GOVERNMENT: BETWEEN TIGERS
AND LIONS
The complexion of the Junta changed when
Aguinaldo departed from Hong Kong. In Hong Kong,
Aguinaldo had been recognized for his leadership but
was not always fully supported. Mainly through force
of character and control of funds, he had succeeded in
keeping the Junta together. Although the bond was
tenuous, it was enough to promote his ambitions. Basic
differences, scarcely submerged during Aguinaldo '
s
presence, surfaced as soon as the McCulloch had dropped
below the horizon.
The men close to Aguinaldo, committed to
independence, formed the "inner circle" of the Junta.
The early exiles in Hong Kong--wealthy and influential
— constituted the "outer circle," which desired the
annexation of the Philippines by America, or the status
of a protectorate. Since their financial support and
influence were needed desperately, Aguinaldo courted
them. They expressed their desires and wrote cir-
culars, in the belief that they were influencing
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policies. Aguinaldo, however, never allowed them to
say much about the plans of the Junta.
Wildman repoi-'ted on May 6 , and again on the
fourteenth that Cortes, Basa, Rosario, and Gonzaga,
patriai"'chs of wealthy Filipino families in Hong Kong,
offered their fortunes to the United States and desired
to become American citizens. Not content to express
their desires to Wildman, these men sent cables to
Senator Marcus Alonzo Hanna of Ohio, imploring him in
the name of "humanity" and "Christianity" to aid in
. . . 2 . .
obtainxng annexation. Cabling President McKinley on
August 8, Basa claimed that well-to-do, educated
3Filipinos prayed for a protectorate or annexation.
Some may have proclaimed allegiance to insure their
interests. Agoncillo wrote Aguinaldo that
Maximo Cortes gave PI 0,0 00 to the American Consul
[WildmanJ . . . because the latter promised him
to write to the Admiral [Dewey] not to bombard his
real estate in Manila.*^
Since many of the wealthy Filipinos in Hong
Kong believed that Aguinaldo was fighting for annexa-
tion to the United States, they contributed money
through the Junta. Although Aguinaldo had no intention
of using the donations for that purpose, neither he nor
the Junta were about to question the ethics of
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accepting the money, for they needed all the help they
could get. The Junta's money was banked in time
deposit, and only ?50,000—the money Aguinaldo withdrew
before leaving for Singapore--was immediately available
5to the insurgents.
When it became clear that Aguinaldo 's goal was
independence, most of the wealthy exiles withdrew their
financial support. A few continued to align themselves
with Aguinaldo and contributed what they could as
evidence of their preference for independence rather
than annexation. The Philippine Insurgent Records
register a donation of P7,000 to the Hong Kong Junta
by Juana Montilla from Yisaya. In another instance, a
rich Ilongo, Esteban de la Rama, donated twelve rifles
and twelve revolvers to the Junta for shipment to the
Philippines.
The "insiders" did not view the activities of
the "outsiders" with much alarm, for they believed
erroneously that the influence of the wealthy Filipinos
was minimal. Consul Wildman wrote to the Department of
State from Hong Kong in July, 18 98:
I believe I know the sentiments of the politi-
cal leaders and of the moneyed men among the
insurgents, and, in spite of all statements to the
contrary, I knovj that they are fighting for annexa-
tion to the United States first, and for
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independence secondly, if the United States decides
to decline the sovereignty of the islands. In fact
I have had the most prominent leaders call on me
and they would not raise one finger unless I could
assure them that the United States intended to give
them United States citizenship if they wished it
.
'^
Wildman believed that the wealthy exiles were
the leaders of the Junta or, at the very least, wielded
tremendous influence. His conclusion was incorrect
but, since he was a respected and presumably respon-
sible official, the impact of his evaluation affected
the cause of the insurgents.
The responsibility of keeping the Junta
together was inherited by Filipe Agoncillo. He was by
far the most capable man among those left in Hong Kong,
and he was loyal to Aguinaldo's purpose. Agoncillo was
not at this time concerned about the actions of the
wealthy Filipinos, for he was immediately confronted
with a challenge from within the inner circle. His
first letter to Aguinaldo on May 27, 1898, complained
that "Sandico is bitterly criticising me to our
Q
companions." In the same letter, but dated the next
day, Agoncillo added "that Sandico, induced by the
friends of Artacho , has for some time past been
9
criticising me to the companions." Sandico and
several companions, he continued, had resigned from, the
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Junta with the intention of establishing another
committee composed of the friends of Artacho
.
Sandico's friendship and sympathy for Artacho
were reprehensible to Agoncillo, who believed that
Artacho vjas a greedy opportunist and traitor. Another
area of disagreement was the procurement and shipment
of arms and ammunition. Confident that the consul
could assure the safety and success of the shipment,
Sandico and his followers wanted the arms sent through
Wildman. On the other hand, Agoncillo and his group
were opposed to the use of a middleman, particularly a
third-party alien. Agoncillo reasoned:
As far as politics are concerned, is it advisable
that the consul should know the number of arms
sent which will enable him to estimate our
strength? I think it is not. Though I am of the
opinion that we should pay the consul every
respect, still I believe that we should not
belittle ourselves to the extent of being in a
relation of a child to a guardian, because such
being the case, what will he think of us and what
information shall he give to his government?!'^
Apparently Agoncillo confronted Sandico and
won him over. Sandico withdrew his resignation, and
presumably a meeting to establish another revolutionary
committee never occurred. Confrontations of this





I will not state at length everything which has
happened here, because I do not wish you to become
disgusted. But I can tell you that there are many
here with great and selfish ambitions. ^
Agoncillo's concern to maintain the unity and
effectiveness of the Junta transcended his personal
feelings about the actions of Sandico's faction.
13 . . . .Agoncillo's group held the positions of power within
the Junta, while Sandico's group, although capable of
destructively splitting the Junta, was not strong
enough to usurp Agoncillo's power. Because of loyalty
to Aguinaldo and of the importance of the Junta to
the revolutionary cause, Agoncillo never made an overt
move against Sandico or his followers . Slight appease-
ment was preferable to the destruction of the Junta.
Steering clear of an open clash with Sandico, Agoncillo
did not demand an accounting of the funds used in the
first arms-buying operation. At the direction of
Aguinaldo, the Junta reluctantly assigned another
P50,000 to Sandico for the purchase of more war
materials
.
The first arms transaction arranged by Sandico
had ended in disaster. He had entrusted nearly
Pi|7,00 to an American in Hong Kong for the purchase •
of arms which were never bought. The money could not
be recovered, for such transactions were illegal and
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the British regarded arms as contraband of war. Some
members of the Junta suspected Sandico of taking part
of the money. Cn May 30, Agoncillo wrote to Aguinaldo
that many of the m.embers had no confidence in Sandico,
and ended his letter with the comment that "those v.'ho
work in good faith in this world, never seem to have
mluck, but It is the rascal who enjoys success." It
is clear that the "rascal" Agoncillo referred to was
Sandico.
Despite the Junta's views, Sandico arranged a
second transaction through an intermediary to whom he
paid P60,000 for 2,000 rifles and 200,000 rounds of
ammunition. The arms were extremely expensive;
included in their cost was the price of the transport
vessel and a staggering P12,673 commission for the
middleman. In June, 18 98, Sandico sailed with the arms
to Cavite, fearing for his life; the companions sent
with him by the Junta were Filipinos who believed he
was a traitor. Although his worries were justified,
15
Sandico succeeded in delivering the arms.
Despite such internal problems, the Junta
procured and shipped more arms to the Philippines.
Belarmino reported on June 7, that two consignments
consisting of 9,000 rifles and 3,000 cartridges were
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scheduled to reach the Philippines shortly, but two
cannon were left behind in the haste to get the ship-
ment underway.
By the middle of June, the Junta's ability to
ship arms was severely hampered, this time from an
outside source. The Spanish consul, keeping a close
watch, protested the action of the Junta to the Hong
Kong authorities. This forced the British officials to
take action; they subsequently uncovered a cache of
. . . . . . 17
arms and ammunition intended for the Philippines.
This violation of British neutrality resulted in a
prohibition of Filipino movement to and from the Crown
Colony. Even the American consular launch was searched
18
en route to visit vessels in the harbor. Neverthe-
less, the Hong Kong Junta struggled on.
In view of the increased vigilance of the
British authorities and the difficulty in procuring
war materials in Hong Kong, the Junta began to explore
other sources of arms. Agoncillo appointed two trusted
men, Mariano Ponce and Faustino Lichauco, to go to
Japan to ascertain the possibility of enlisting
assistance. When the Japanese proved amenable to the
idea of selling arms. Ponce and Lichauco made arrange-
ments for the purchase and requested money from the
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Hong Kong Junta. The original order was for P30,000,
which was quickly made available; but the cost of a
schooner to transport weapons left only enough money
to purchase 1,000 rifles. Since the cost of transporta-
tion was fixed, Ponce realized the economy of increasing
the size of the shipment and accordingly requested
additional funds. Through an oversight, the check
which the Junta sent to Japan was not transferable, and
could only be cashed in Hong Kong on the due date.
The remittance had to be returned and exchanged for
cash. In the meantime, the Japanese, who were ready to
conclude the transaction, requested P200,000 to be
deposited in the Yokohama Specie Bank. Since the
Filipinos in Yokohama did not have this sum, they
delayed, waiting for the cash to arrive from Hong Kong.
Meanwhile, open hostilities had broken out between
American and Filipino forces. Thereupon the Japanese,
not wishing to be involved, suspended the trans-
19
iaction. I
Open help from Japan could not be expected as
long as the United States was involved with the ,
Philippines. Active assistance of the Filipino
insurgents, especially with United States forces in
the Philippines, would surely be interpreted as a sign
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of belligerency to the United States, a nation with
2
which Japan had no desire to go to war.
Two more feckless attempts were made to pur-
chase guns from the Japanese. In April, 1899, a vessel
loaded with arms sank in a typhoon a hundred miles from
Shanghai. A second shipment could not be landed in the
Philippines due to the vigilance of American coastal
patrols, now alert to Filipino attempts to import arms.
It was diverted to Formosa and eventually transferred
to the Chinese mainland where it fell into the hands
of supporters of the Chinese revolutionary, Sun
V ^ 21Yat-sen.
Despite its officially neutral policy, Japan
did support the Filipino cause. A number of Japanese
veterans of the Sino-Japanese War volunteered to fight
for the Filipinos; cloth, uniforms, and a few weapons
were also obtained. Newspapers and officials were
generally in favor of Philippine independence; a few
22
even criticized alleged American imperialism.
Japanese sympathy, enthusiasm, and involvement never-
theless remained on an individual, personal level.
While the Junta was struggling to obtain more
arms for Aguinaldo, the insurgent leader was solidify-
ing his power among the people. The arms already
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received and the local support he was attracting gave
him a degree of independence fi'-om the Americans
blockading Manila Bay. Time was essential, however;
the arrival of American reinforcements would undermine
Aguinaldo ' s bargaining position--the main strength of
which was Aguinaldo 's control of land forces necessary
to maintain the siege of Manila. From May 21 to
May 24, Aguinaldo issued orders for an uprising against
Spain. On the twenty-fourth, he proclaimed himself
dictator, promising to relinquish his power to a
president and cabinet appointed by a constitutional




The first American troops sailed from San
Francisco on May 25, approximately a month before they
reached their destination. During this time Aguinaldo
had to obtain control of Spanish territory upon which
to establish a government sufficient to convince the
Americans of the legitimacy of his leadership. The
Hong Kong Junta and Aguinaldo would then ask for the
24
recognitxon of their government.
Ultimate success was dependent upon the
Filipinos' ability to convince foreign governments of




those whom they wanted to impress was the United
States, whose recognition, the Filipino leaders
believed, would contribute to world acceptance. A
republican form of government was chosen for its
appeal to the American people. The Philippines would
become the first Christian Asiatic republic, a nomen-
clature which was expected to elicit sympathy from
America.
Throughout May and the early part of June, the
insurgents were extremely successful. Eager volunteers
flocked to their standard. On June 12, 18 98, at
Cavite Vie jo, Aguinaldo proclaimed the independence of
25the Philippines. He was convinced that there was
tremendous propaganda value in such action; the people
would now have a real cause and would be inspired to
fight the Spaniards all the more fiercely.
Aguinaldo' s successes and rapidly growing military
strength gave him confidence and influenced his
27decision to remove doubts as to his real intentions.
Further insight into Aguinaldo 's reason for
proclaiming Philippine independence at this time is




The American representatives had limited themselves
to ambiguous verbal promises, which Mr. Aguinaldo
had accepted because he ardently desired to return
to the islands, fearful that other influential
Filipinos should (rob him of glory and) reach an
understanding with the Americans in the name of
the people.
In this same statement, Mabini also criticized
Aguinaldo 's decision.
I realized also that the proclamation of inde-
pendence which was being made that day was
premature and imprudent because the Americans
were concealing their true designs while we were
making ours manifest. I foresaw, of course, that
because of this want of caution the American
commanders and forces would be on guard against
the revolutionists, and the United States consuls
on the China coast would sabotage the purchase of
arms for the revolution. 28
With the establishment of a dictatorial
government and the proclamation of Philippine inde-
pendence, the Hong Kong Junta was assigned additional
duties. Its location in the British Crown Colony
facilitated contact with foreign countries. The Junta
was still a collection of the more educated and capable
Filipino nationalists who, due to the political state
of affairs, could not conveniently return home. Since,
in the establishment of a government, Aguinaldo would
need a corps of representatives, the exiles in Hong
Kong would be logical and convenient choices.
Agoncillo, the head of the Junta, was recognized as
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one of the ablest diplomats among the insurgents.
Crucial to Aguinaldo's plans was the task of drawing
the United States into an open alliance and other
foreign powers into a sympathetic recognition of
Filipino belligerency. It was Aguinaldo's intention
to utilize the Hong Kong Junta to accomplish this end.
After setting up a central government, his next objec-
tive was to gain the attention of the foreign powers;
recognition, he felt sure, would eventually follow.
On June 23, 1898, Aguinaldo issued a decree
which established the BepartTuent of Foreign Relations,
consisting of three bureaus--Diplomacy , Navy, and
Commerce. The first bureau was to
consider and dispatch all the business which
pertains to the direction of diplomatic negotia-
tions with other powers, and the correspondence
"of this government with the same.
In addition,
the Government shall establish a Revolutionary
Committee abroad, composed of an undetermined
number of the most competent persons of the
Philippine Archipelago.
The Delegation of Diplomacy shall take steps
for and negotiate with foreign cabinets the
recognition of the Philippine belligerency and
independence. 29
This committee was designed to take charge of what
could only be called a "propaganda corps."
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Following an early suggestion made by
30Agoncillo, Aguinaldo wrote to him on August 7, 18 98,
with instructions to go to the United States as soon
as possible,
so that McKinley's government may know our true
situation. Make him understand that our country
has its own government, that civil organizations
exist in the provinces already taken and soon the
congress of representatives of these provinces
will meet. Tell them that they cannot do with the
Philippines as they wish, because many misfortunes
may happen both to us and to them if we do not
come to an agreement as to our future I'elations.
'•to-'
A letter for President McKinley is herewith
sent to you, so that he may recognize you as m.y
representative. . . . When congress shall have
been assembled and said arrangements made, I will
send you your proper credentials.
The policy which you will pursue in the United
States is the following:
Make them understand that whatever may be their
intentions towards us, that it is not possible for
them to overrule the sentiments of the people
represented by the government, and they must first
recognize it if we are to come to an agreement.
Still do not accept any contracts or give any
promises respecting protection or annexation,
because we will see first if we can obtain inde-
pendence. This is what we shall endeavor to
secure meanwhile if it should be possible to do so,
still give them to understand in a way that you
are unable to bind yourself but that once we are
independent we will be able to make arrangements
with them.
I have entire confidence in your recognized
ability and wisdom which I also knew when we were
companions, and 1 hope you will now pull all your
moral courage together, because we will be between
tigers and lions. Still, I believe you will be




Agoncillo was also instructed to publish the
"Act of Proclamation of Independence" and the "Mani-
festo to Foreign Governments" in the Hong Kong
32papers. On August 10, Aguinaldo again urged
Agoncillo to leave for America immediately, and to
33leave the Junta to others. On the same day Aguinaldo
penned instructions for Sandico and, in order to
legitimize the Hong Kong Junta ^ he issued a decree
making the Junta a permanent and official body.
Sandico was instructed, first, to unify all Filipino
subjects in Hong Kong and to pei'suade those of con-
trary opinions to cooperate in the government's
(Aguinaldo ' s) policy; second, to prepare and organize
the Revolutionary Committee; and, third, to struggle
for independence while maintaining good terms with
Washington,
entreating the recognition of the Filipino Govern-
ment under pretext that such recognition consti-
tutes a sine qua non before any terms of agreement
between the United States and "the Philippines."
Sandico was to seek an alliance with the United States
even if the Carolines and Marianas had to be sacri-
ficed, but protection or annexation were to be
considered acceptable only if independence by force of
arms or diplomacy was impossible. Agoncillo was also
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to maintain communication with correspondents in Paris
and London, and negotiate with foreign commercial
34houses.
Aguinaldo's decree legitimizing the Junta
listed himself as head of the Department of Foreign
Affairs under which was established a managing board,
members, and correspondents. Don Vicente Ilustre, a
Filipino living in Paris, was appointed president of
the board, and Sandico secretary. The members were all
residents of Hong Kong. Correspondents were appointed
to various foreign countries: Pedro P. Roxas to
France, Antonio Regidor to England, and Filipe
35Agoncillo to the United States.
While the managing board represented the
government abroad, it required special authority to
conclude treaties. The board administered the funds
of the government abroad, and recommended the appoint-
ment of correspondents in foreign countries. Further
duties of the board encompassed all work of propaganda
abroad, all diplomatic negotiations, and the prepara-
tion of expeditions necessary for the revolution.
Under the guidance of Aguinaldo's decrees, the Hong
Kong Junta functioned as a listening post for the
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revolutionary government, a procurement office for war
materials, and a propaganda agency.
Many of the appointments seem political in
nature; they did not facilitate a smooth operation, but
promoted unity and loyalty to Aguinaldo's government.
Since many appointed to membership and offices within
the committee were absent, Aguinaldo issued another
decree on August 24; it recreated the Revolutionary
Committee at Hong Kong, specifically outlining its
duties, defining its powers, and specifying its
37
composition.
In addition, by a decree dated November 23,
1898, Aguinaldo created a commission
charged with informing the civilized world of the
true political and social condition of the country
and of the capability of the Filipinos to govern
themselves, as also to petition the foreign
governments for the official recognition of the
independence and government of the Philippines
... .38
Agoncillo was appointed president of this commission
and the members were authorized to "appear before any
legally recognized government and represent the
39interests of the Filipinos before the same . . . ."
On August 13, 1898, Manila surrendered to the
American forces. The Filipino insurgents were refused
entry into the city and relations quickly became
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strained. It seemed increasingly clear to some of the
Filipino leaders that the Americans had intentions
different from those anticipated. Implied promises
were not materializing. If they had not realized it
earlier, the Filipinos now realized that they must
look to their own interests and conduct their own
negotiations with authorized American and other foreign
representatives. The hasty organization of a diplo-
matic corps was the result.
On August 26, Agoncillo wrote to Aguinaldo for
his credentials to the United States and suggested
that one or two more representatives be sent with him
40in order to form a diplomatic mission. Agoncillo
wanted to keep up appearances of friendship for the
Americans but continue preparations for war.
Four days later, Aguinaldo sent Agoncillo his
final instructions, informing him that Major General
Wesley Merritt, Commander of the Third Expeditionary
Force, was leaving Manila to take part in the Paris
Peace Conference. Agoncillo was to
proceed as quickly as possible to America, in order
to know what takes place. If perchance we should
go back to Spanish control, ask them to help us
as the French helped them during their own revolu-
tion and ask also the terms.
I am not yet informed if it is true that our
representatives are to be admitted to the
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Coirjnission ; if they should be admitted, go immedi-
ately to the place where they will meet, which it
is said here will be Paris, September 15th, and if
among our countrymen there or in London there be
one who will agree with the policy of the govern-
ment, according to your instructions, propose him
at once, so that credential Isicl may be sent him.
I am hastening the constitution of Congress so
that it may at once consider some resolutions. In
whatever agreement you may make you will insert as
a condition the ratification of this government.
As early as possible I will transmit to you
the names of those composing the committee in
Hong Kong according to the enclosed decree. You
can leave all the affairs I have confided to you
in the hands of Galicano [Apacible] and Sefior
Crisanto Lichauco until the Board of Directors
(.Junta Direativa) shall be established . ^1
At the same time, Aguinaldo instructed the various
diplomatic representatives abroad to entangle the
United States in the affairs of the Philippines so that
foreign powers might be prevented from dividing up the
country. The Filipinos were afraid that, like China,
the Philippines would be partitioned by Western powers.
If there were to be absorption by a foreign power,
America was preferable.
With Agoncillo about to leave for the United
States, Galicano Apacible, one of the leaders of the
Junta, prepared to assume Agoncillo 's duties in Hong
Kong. The fragile harmony of the Junta was disrupted
by these changes. Apacible was sympathetic to
Agoncillo, not Sandico. Not achieving his desires in
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Hong Kong and unable to achieve dominance over the
Junta, Sandico returned to Manila, where he worked for
Aguinaldo and the Americans. Basa, Cortes, and other
annexationists, realizing that their position differed
from that of the revolutionary cadre, defected to form
a separate, loosely organized group lobbying for
annexation. Others also resigned from the Junta, and,
as a result, the Junta reorganized itself in November,
1898, and appointed new officers. Galicano Apacible




The steamer China arrived in Hong Kong on
September 1, 1898, with General Merritt and other
officers on their way to Paris to appear before the
Peace Commission. The Junta received permission from
Merritt, the ranking officer, for Agoncillo to travel
aboard the vessel to the United States. Merritt went
to Paris by way of Suez, and General Francis V. Green,
of the United States Volunteers, who was returning to
the United States, as a courtesy, offered to assist
Agoncillo during the voyage. On September 2, the




During the voyage Agoncillo tried to convince
Green of the Filipinos' ability to sustain an inde-
pendent government. Apparently he was successful, for
45Green went out of his way to assist them.
Agoncillo, accompanied by Green, arrived in
Washington on September 27. Prior to departing Hong
Kong, Agoncillo had tried to arrange a meeting with
McKinley; he sent a telegram congratulating the presi-
dent on the close of war and occupation of Manila, and
requesting representation on the Peace Commission to
46decide the future of the Philippine Islands. McKinley
did not reply. In the American capital, Agoncillo,
through Green, requested an official conference, but
the president regretfully refused, although he expressed
47
a willingness to see Agoncillo unofficially. The
United States was in the process of negotiating a peace
treaty with Spain; the revolutionary government,
declared by i^guinaldo, had never been recognized and
officially did not exist. Therefore, official recog-
nition of Agoncillo would have constituted recognition
of the Philippine government.
When the State Department also refused to
accept his credentials, Agoncillo realized the futility
of his position and arranged to see the president
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unofficially. He was received privately by McKinley
on October 1, and given the opportunity to present his
case. Recounting the Filipinos' struggle to be free,
Agoncillo informed the president that the Filipinos
desired representation on the Paris Peace Commission.
Sensing that this request would not be permitted,
Agoncillo requested permission to present the Filipino
case to the United States commissioners. McKinley in
turn suggested that the presentation be personal,
without Agoncillo' s official designation. Since
insistence on an official note would result in complete
rejection, Agoncillo acceded. On October 3, he sub-
mitted his note to Assistant Secretary of State Alvey
A. Adee , who in turn showed it to the president. The
document was accepted with certain amendments suggested
by McKinley. In essence, the note claimed the
existence of a "lawful de facto government" and
48
requested official recognition of this fact.
A decision was made to forward the note to the
American commissioners in Paris, and Agoncillo was
advised to go to France to confer in person with them.
It is apparent, in retrospect, that Agoncillo 's
presence was an embarrassment to McKinley 's adminis-




Filipino government. Agoncillo telegraphed Aguinaldo
that he had been well received, but the Paris Commis-
sion would decide to whom the Philippines belonged.
Although many people thought that the Philippines would
be given independence, Agoncillo himself was not
optimistic and advised Aguinaldo to prepare for war.
Before leaving for Paris, Agoncillo tried to
generate greater influence by sympathizers of the
Filipino cause. He appealed to the Ajnerican Episcopal
Bishops, who were holding a conference in Washington,
ta back the Philippine independence movement. Pre-
sumably they would have sympathy for the victims of a
situation brought about by Catholicism; but the bishops
failed to respond. In general, Protestant missionary
groups were interested in the Philippines as a new
field for their endeavors, which would be facilitated
by annexation. Although the Philippine population was
almost entirely Catholic, many believed that the people
needed to be Christianized.
In Paris, Agoncillo continued his desperate
attempts to gain support. He contacted Senator Cushman
Davis of Minnesota, one of the American commissioners,
but Davis refused to commit himself and claimed that
the Filipino question had not yet been discussed.
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Agoncillo repeatedly requested a hearing by the peace
commissioners, but they refused. The hopelessness of
his cause was fast becoming evident and Agoncillo
wrote Apacible to hurry the purchase of arms and pre-
pare for probable conflict with America, but not to
provoke war.
On December 10, 1898, the final draft of the
Paris Treaty was signed, providing for the cession of
the entire archipelago to the United States. Spain
would be paid $20,000,000.
As a last resort, on December 12, Agoncillo
released to the press and foreign legations in Paris
a formal protest against
any resolutions agreed upon at the peace con-
ference in Paris as long as the judicial, politi-
cal, and independent personality of the Filipino
people is entirely unrecognized . ^3
Although the results of the peace conference
were disappointing and the Filipino cause seemed hope-
less, there was still a chance that the United States
Senate would not ratify the treaty. Substantial
opposition to annexation still existed. President
McKinley seems to have been undecided until he made a
tour of the western states and concluded that the
people supported acquisition of the Philippines. This
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was not the only influence upon his decision to ask for
cession of the entire archipelago, McKinley had
received numerous letters from Filipinos in Kong Kong
begging for American citizenship; in addition there
were strong comm.ercial, military, and missionary
lobbies for annexation. The president claimed, in a
discussion with the General Missionary Committee of the
Methodist Episcopal Church, that he had gone down on
his knees to God and prayed for guidance in this
54
crucial decision. However McKinley had made up his
mind, the Senate remained divided between imperialists
and anti-imperialists, between expansionists and anti-
expansionists .
In the Philippines and Hong Kong, the rebel
leaders realized the hopelessness of the situation, and
were preparing for armed conflict. Still, they con-
tinued to explore every way to attain recognition.
They proposed an agreement of peace and friendship
with Spain as soon as the latter would recognize an
independent Philippine government. The related pro-
posals were not as favorable to Spain as the Paris
Peace Treaty, nor did they preclude the possibility of
re-opening hostilities against the United States.
55
Spain did not take the proposal seriously. Aguxnaldo
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wrote McKinley a letter proposing the Philippines be
made a protectorate under the United States, but this
too was Ignored.
In Washington, Agoncillo tried to arrange an
interview with McKinley. His supplications went
57
unanswered. On January 11, 1899, Agoncillo wrote to
Secretary of State John Hay, imploring him to consider
mutual communications. Honoring the official policy
of nonrecognition. Hay disregarded Agoncillo'
s
5 8letters. Agoncillo' s memorial to the Senate, dated
January 30, 189 9, was his last attempt at convincing
the government of the United States to recognize the
Philippines. He argued that Spain had had no right to
59
cede the Philippines to the United States. Agoncillo
submitted this memorial to Secretary Hay for presenta-
tion to Congress, but there was no acknowledgment by
Hay.
On February 5, 189 9, one day before the
scheduled Senate vote on the treaty, hostilities broke
out between Filipino and American troops. Unknown to
the Filipino insurgents, the Senate was deadlocked on
ratification. The fighting seems to have tipped the
scales, for it broke the psychological restraints on
those senators who could not make up their minds. The
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Senate ratified the treaty next day, by a vote of
fifty-seven to twenty-seven--one vote more than the
necessary two-thirds.
Agoncillo's hopes for Philippine independence
evaporated with the Senate's ratification of the peace
treaty. Attacked by the press as a possible enemy
agent, Agoncillo complained to Secretary Hay, but
received no response. Friends warned the Filipino
diplomat of the possibility of arrest; not wishing to
suffer this embarrassment, Agoncillo left quietly for
Canada. Here he was out of touch with events,
followed by American Secret Service men, and afraid
to communicate by telegraph since facilities in the
Philippines were now controlled by the United States,
Although the Canadians offered him sanctuary, Agoncillo
boarded a steamer for Europe. He had failed, and his
R 9
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CHAPTER V
SUCCESS, FAILURE, AND CONSEQUENCES
The failure of Filipino diplomacy to influence
the Paris peace negotiations, the American decision to
acquire the Philippines , and the increasing bitterness
between Filipino insurgents and American volunteers
shattered the Filipinos ' confidence regarding the
intentions of the United States. The smoldering
distrust of Americans flared into open hostility during
the last quarter of 1898 and exploded into war by
February, 18 99.
Aware of Filipino feelings. President McKinley
informed Major-General E. S. Otis, Commander of American
forces in the Philippines, that the paramount aim of the
military administration should be to win the respect,
confidence, and affection of the inhabitants: "the
mission of the United States is one of benevolent
assimilation . . . ." But the bitter and distrustful
Filipinos were not interested in "benevolent assimila-
tion" ; they wanted to consolidate their revolutionary
gains. Psychologically they were prepared for war;
conciliatory measures short of independence would not
satisfy them. The insurgents had recently tasted
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victory over the Spaniards, and they were now willing
to test their strength against the Americans. Seem-
ingly casual in military bearing, the Americans were
regarded as poorer soldiers than the Spaniards. In
practice, however, the struggle was not waged solely in
the Philippines, nor only with bolos and rifles.
While Agoncillo was in Washington, the Junta
began an ambitious propaganda campaign. On November 6,
1898, Apacible, the new head of the Junta, recommended
• . 2bribxng correspondents of forexgn news services
.
Propaganda committees were formed in Europe and wherever
Filipinos gathered. In Paris, Agoncillo tried to use
the local propaganda committee to attract and influence
the Peace Commission, publishing an "Act of Adhesion"
. . . 3directed to the Philippine government. In Spam,
Filipino residents formed the Filipino Republican
Committee of Madrid, which produced a propaganda paper,
Fi-lipinas ante Europa
.
By the spring of 189 9, the propaganda campaign
was well underway. The Manila Times., a hostile American
newspaper, asked: "Will None Of My Gallant Knights Rid
Me Of This Troublous Priest?" The paper was not speak-





Day after day we came across more cases of the
remarkably false news that is being disseminated by
Filipino agents all over the world, the Junta in
Hong Kong being most notorious in this respect. It
is scarcely conceivable that respectable news agen-
cies would allow themselves to be influenced, or be
indiscreet enough to be "taken in," by these polit-
ical schemers. Nevertheless, telegrams are
appearing in papers all over the world purporting
to have been supplied by Reuters and the Associated
Press which are nothing but a barefaced conglomera-
tion of lies .... 5
It would seem that the world's press did not verify its
sources, or Apacible's scheme to bribe correspondents
was succeeding.
In some ways, the propaganda effort had adverse
effects upon the Filipinos. Anxious to send encourage-
ment and to impress foreign sympathizers with public
support for the Filipino cause, agents reported meetings
with anti-imperialists and sympathetic men of promi-
nence. Every favorable word, whether hesitantly or
reservedly given, was amplified until it became a
conunitment or a promise. Often a pessimistic evaluation
was ignored or converted to favor the Filipinos.
In the Philippines circulars containing over-
statements, sincere or not, were delivered to insurgent
chiefs in isolated areas. The propaganda, taken out of
context and misinterpreted, produced a false sense of




An example of unrealistic reporting was the
Junta's evaluation of the Democratic party in the United
States. In early 1900, agents of the Junta claimed to
have had an interview with William Jennings Bryan, the
presidential candidate of the Democrats. They took
this opportunity to invite Bryan to participate in a
conference between Filipino agents and anti-imperial-
ists, but Bryan refused lest he be called a traitor.
In his stead he "sent a most trusted person, his right
hand man, Dr. Gardner." The conference was summarized
in a letter to Aguinaldo from I . de los Santos , a
Filipino agent: first, Bryan would never cease to
defend Filipino rights; second, Bryan's name could
never be mentioned in any manifesto; and third, in
behalf of Bryan, Gardner promised that, if elected
president, Bryan would recognize Philippine indepen-
dence. De los Santos proposed that Filipino agents
take up residence in Washington "pending the outcome of
the presidential contest, aiding propaganda, and enliv-
ening it until November . . . ." Two thousand pounds
sterling ($20,000) was also necessary "for the propa-
ganda, for paying newspapers and for bribing senators
—
7
this last clause is very important but difficult."
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To the Filipinos , the agents ' reports repre-
sented a solid assurance of support for the rebels. An
objective evaluation would not have substantiated the
second-hand promises of a politician who refused to let
his name be used by his supposed allies.
The agents assured the Junta that the Democratic
party would come into power in the next election.
McKinley, the enemy of the Filipinos, would be deposed
and a president favorable to Philippine independence
would take office. This message was spread through
circulars calling themselves "extracts from our corre-
spondence with America," "news from our foreign agents,"
or "news from America." A new and powerful party had
supposedly arisen in America to demand Philippine
independence.
The claims were embellished by the guerrilla
chiefs, who told their men that anti-imperialists were
hanging imperialists in the streets of America, and
that the fight should continue against American sym-
9pathizers among the native populace. Even
sophisticates such as F. Buencamino celebrated Bryan's
support with banquets and toasts. However, when
Bryan was defeated soundly and McKinley was reelected.

im
irreparable damage was done to the morale of the
insurgents
.
Not all propaganda generated by the Junta came
from Filipino sources. W. H. Bray, an opportunistic
Englishman, was particularly active. Aside from main-
taining a steady correspondence with Aguinaldo and
providing advice, Bray appeared in Hong Kong around
September, 1898, and became the press representative of
the Junta.
When open warfare broke out, the character of
Bray's press releases changed into aggressive propa-
ganda, denouncing American military tactics and
accusing the American forces of committing atrocities.
These broadsides , which even exceeded the claims of
Aguinaldo' 8 native correspondents, were of value to the
insurgent cause in providing fuel for the anti-impe-
rialists. Despite Bray's usefulness, which was
partially based on the fact that his nationality lent
credibility to his charges and claims, the Junta was
wary of him. In a confidential letter to Aguinaldo in
August, 1899, a member of the Junta stated, "Whatever
we do he will never bring a law suit against us as we
have documents in our hands which will injure him in
12pocket and reputation . . . ."
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In Hong Kong, Consul Wildman lost the trust of
the Junta and his advice no longer affected its
policies . The State Department censure and the course
of events had finally convinced Bryan that his labor
would be fruitless. By the time fighting broke out,
Wildman was working against the Junta's efforts to
13procure arms
.
The insurgents' financial resources were being
rapidly depleted with relatively little to show for
their purchases. Repeatedly, agents of the Junta were
forced to pay bribes--"squeeze"--to consummate their
deals. By mid-December, 1898, the PUOO,000 acquired by
Aguinaldo from the Spaniards had been released by the
Hong Kong banks; what was left was guarded carefully.
One of the Junta's most costly lessons resulted
from an arms contract arranged through Spitzel Company,
an American firm headquartered in Shanghai. G.
Lichauco, an agent of the Junta, signed a purchase
agreement written in English, which he could not read.
The contract obligated the Junta to pay P170,000 for
arms of which delivery in the Philippines was very
uncertain. When the Junta delayed prepayment, the
Spitzel Company threatened a lawsuit. Thereupon the
Junta paid PlSOjOO.O and agreed to make no claim for

116
the rifles. A full report was made to Aguinaldo in
which the Junta staff explained that they were honor-
bound to pay; a lawsuit would have exposed their
operations and probably caused their expulsion from
. . . . mHong Kong by Brxtish authorities. These were weak
excuses tendered by men who had little business
experience or knowledge of law. Dealings in arms were
as illegal for commercial firms in China as for
Filipino exiles in Hong Kong. A contractor had little
chance to win a lawsuit centering on an unlawful service
never performed. Obviously the Junta's leaders did not
consult the successful Filipino businessmen in Hong
Kong, who undoubtedly would have recognized that the
charges of the Spitzel Company were a paper threat.
Correspondence between the Junta and Aguinaldo,
even after the outbreak of hostilities, was replete
with schemes to acquire arms. The Junta continually
pleaded for funds, which the Filipino government was
unable to provide. Apart from their own desperate
financial needs, the insurgent leaders may have
considered the Junta a poor risk for expending their
meager assets. Instructions were occasionally issued
concerning the covert landing of arms, but it is
unknown whether these arms were procured through the
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Junta after hostilities began. It is a fact, however,
that arms were obtained by the insurgents. Spanisli
officers--prisoners of the insurgents in a position to
know— estimated that Aguinaldo had obtained 56,000
rifles from Spain by various means.
The other agents of the Junta appointed by
Aguinaldo in August, 1898 did not fare any better than
Agoncillo. In France, Roxas seems to have accomplished
nothing. Ponce and Lichauco continued to intrigue in
Japan but won no tangible support. Regidor, the
representative in London , kept up correspondence with
the Hong Kong Junta
,
giving advice and submitting
various plans for fighting the Americans , but he con-
tributed nothing tangible. Sixto Lopez joined Regidor
when Agoncillo left Canada for Europe.
There is evidence that Lopez had his own ideas
concerning the diplomatic representation of the
Philippines, and that he was a source of discord among
his fellow agents. On June 8, 1899, Agoncillo wrote
that he did not see why Regidor insisted on having
Lopez sent to Washington as Aguinaldo 's representative.
17
He himself would not have Lopez for a secretary. On
June 22, Lopez suggested himself as a representative to
Washington with full powers of negotiation, including
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the right to sell property and borrow money in the name
of the Filipino government. It was his belief that the
time was right to re-negotiate for peace and indepen-
dence, and that he could easily accomplish the task.
He also desired authority to sell Filipino concessions
to wealthy Englishmen, the money to be used to support
the Filipino cause. Probably respecting the advice of
his other agents abroad, Aguinaldo never granted such
18powers TO Lopez.
While in America, Lopez wrote a circular
addressed to the American people and distributed from
Boston. It consisted of reprints of letters pleading
for recognition of and support for the Filipino people.
Many of his statements contained promises he had no
authority to give--an assumption of power that prompts
one to question his understanding of his position
within the revolutionary hierarchy and his overall
grasp of the situation. The end of 1900 found Lopez in
Hong Kong, where he tried to secure passage to the
Philippines. Apparently having lost credibility with
his fellow agents , he was returning to the Philippines
to re-establish his position. When he refused to take
the required oath of allegiance to the United States,
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permission to enter the Philippines was denied by the
19American authorities.
During 1899 and 1900, the Junta received many
letters from Americans favoring Filipino independence.
The missives asked for information, tendered advice,
and proffered congratulations. In March, 1899, the
Junta received a letter from the secretary of the
Single Tax League of Ohio, containing a resolution
drawn up by the Cincinnati branch, which denounced the
"unjust war waged by the Government of the United
States upon the Filipino patriots . . . . " The members
of the club. Democrats and Republicans alike, were
convinced that the war in the Philippines was
being carried on without any pretense of consulting
the will of the American people upon the m.atter,
and at the dictates of the plutocracy which rules
the government ....
The letter closed by "wishing to General Aguinaldo and
his patriot army the greatest success against our army
2
of subjugation, tyranny, and oppression." Such
letters encouraged the Filipino leaders and probably
prolonged the war, just as the activities of some
Americans in the early 197 0s may have lengthened the
Vietnam conflict. The Filipinos did not seem to
recognize that groups such as the Single Tax League of
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Ohio were small, powerless, and viewed as hopelessly
impractical by most Americans at the time.
As their rebellion progressed, the Filipinos
learned of other information which, although discour-
aging, served to strengthen their resolve. Dr.
Ferdinand Blumentritt, an expert on the Philippines,
wrote in June, 1899 that, in his opinion, only two
conditions would be acceptable to the Filipinos--inde-
pendence or an American protectorate. What had
happened in Texas and California would be inevitable if
America took possession—the nativps would become work-
men and employees on the estates they had owned.
Blumentritt predicted:
That proud scorn which characterizes the Yankee in
his political and social contact with colored people
. , . will close their ears to the complaints and
aspirations of the sons of the country and will
laugh at those who helped to bring the country
under the American yoke. 21
There was every reason for the Filipinos to believe
this grim prediction.
Hong Kong was the dissemination point for
Aguinaldo's dispatches, which were smuggled out of the
Philippines. Communication between Aguinaldo and the
Junta became increasingly difficult, however. It is
evident that this physical and administrative isolation
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fostered a divergence of ideas and policy within the
Junta. Continuous internal rivalries and personal
intrigues wasted much energy.
The superior military forces of the United
States had destroyed organized Filipino resistance by
November, 1898, and Aguinaldo began a forced odyssey
that would only end with his capture. By the spring of
1900, the American forces were still keeping Aguinaldo
on the move. The Junta complained that from November,
1899 until May, 1900, only one letter was received from
the insurgent leader. During this period Aguinaldo '
s
communications with his subordinate commanders also
broke down. Isolated by terrain and fighting a war
that V7as becoming increasingly unconventional, the
chiefs tended increasingly to establish themselves as
supreme within their territories.
To survive and to continue the struggle, the
Filipinos had to adopt guerrilla warfare. Aguinaldo
advocated this form of warfare despite the opposition
of some of his top commanders. Unavoidably, warfare
fractionalized the revolutionary government. A real
danger was the easy progression from guerrilla warfare
to banditry, a danger which the more astute Filipino
leaders comprehended. On May 1, 1900, the Junta wrote
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to Aguinaldo, warning him that the United States might
declare an end to the war in the Philippines, and put
into effect the "law of bandits"; that is, might cease
to recognize prisoners of war, only the existence of
robbers and brigands. Although this might well mean the
destruction of the insurrection, the situation was now
22beyond Aguinaldo 's control.
The Junta could only send encouragement to the
scattered Filipino forces, and plead with them to con-
tinue the struggle. This was done in the name of a dis-
integrating government. To its correspondents abroad,
the Junta spoke for a government that, to all intents,
had ceased to exist. Since the deterioration was less
evident to those further removed, Filipinos abroad con-
tinued to promote revolution at home; throughout 190 0,
they urged their countrymen to resist. Their letters
were filled with assertions of growing support for the
Filipino cause and personal assurances that they would
soon be in the Philippines to fight and die beside their
brothers. Few, if any, ever did return. Many requested
money to promote the Filipino cause in foreign countries.
One can only conclude that most of the exiles
had no desire to exchange the safety and luxury of
Europe for the fighting and the sacrificing which they
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so glibly urged upon their countrymen. Their words,
however, tempoi-arily sustained and buoyed the morale of
many Filipinos.
The propaganda campaign reached new intensity
by the end of summer, 1900. The acting head of the
Junta i Riego de Dios , who had replaced Apacible while
the latter made a trip to America in April, requested
more information, especially concerning atrocities
cominitted by American soldiers. The insurgents in the
Philippines tried to supply the information, but by
this time it was difficult tn get information out of
the country and, when they did, their accuracy was
23questionable and their documentation inadequate.
On November 10, 1900, the Junta was obliged to
announce the demoralizing news of McKinley ' s re-
election. Pleas to continue fighting, because the
United States v/ould tire of the conflict, were now
unenthusiastically received by the weary insurgents.
Their hopes had been based on Bryan. The war was going
badly, and there was little prospect of a change. The
Junta and its correspondents continued to- send pathetic
summaries of House and Senatorial allusions to support
of the Filipinos. Translated into Spanish, these
materials were distributed in the Philippines. The
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Junta had lost touch with the revolutionary movement,
for the rebels at home were living from day to day,
constantly on the move and continually harassed by
pursuing enemy forces . Even if they could have under-
stood the intricacies of American politics, they were
hardly in a position to care about the debates of
politicians half a world away.
The Filipino populace had their own reasons for
ignoring the pleas of the Junta, Reforms and increas-
ing stability had followed the American occupation.
Although imperfect, the situation in the Philippines
was promising. On June 21, 1900, General Arthur
MacArthur, who had taken command from General Otis as
military governor of the Philippines, issued a decree
of amnesty to all insurgents surrendering and taking
24
an oath of allegiance. This was one of the first
steps to end the war. On July 2, MacArthur issued a
proclamation granting individual rights to Filipinos.
Peaceable assemblies and festivals began to be held in
and around Manila, the former bastion of insurgent
resistance. Earlier, the Schurman Commission, the
first of two teams sent out by Congress to investigate
the situation, recommended that military government be
replaced by civilian rule. The second team, under
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Taft, began to formulate a specific colonial policy for
the islands. The desire to conciliate the Filipinos





America's attitude was not lost upon the
Filipinos. The guerrillas started to lose urban
support, and an increasing number of disillusioned and
exhausted rebels began surrendering. Many of the
Wealthy and timorous intellectuals, who had never
accepted the fact that their leader was not of their
class, and who feared the emergence of "have nots,"
found it easy to abandon what nov; appeared to be a
9 c
hopeless struggle. They defected to the Americans.
On March 23, 1901, Aguinaldo was captured in
the hills of Palanan, and on April 1, he took the oath
of allegiance to the United States. The Junta
addressed a circular on April 8, to all Filipino
commanders in the field informing them of Aguinaldo 's
capture and of the surrender of other leaders . Even
after the disintegration of his government and the
scattering of his forces, Aguinaldo had remained the
symbol of independence and resistance. His capture was




Perhaps significantly, Aguinaldo's capture was
initiated when a small group of insurgents surrendered
to Lieutenant D. Taylor of the 24th U. S. Infantry. In
their possession were several letters from Aguinaldo
addressed to Filipino leaders. One of the captured
Filipinos, Cecilio Segismundo, revealed Aguinaldo's
hideout. Brigadier General Fredrick Funston, Commander
of the 24th Infantry, formulated a bold plan, utilizing
Lazaro Segovia, a Spaniard who had also been an insur-
gent. That former rebels helped to capture Aguinaldo
is indicative of the deterioration of morale, and of
the willing acceptance of their fate at the hands of
27the Americans.
The Hong Kong Junta did not expire at once, but
survived in a moribund state until July 31, 1903, when
it was officially dissolved. Some members began to
filter back to the Philippines, while others, conspic-
uous in their pride, chose to remain in exile. One
individual, Artemio Ricarte , attempted to rekindle the
revolutionary flame.
Ricarte was a general in the insurgent army.
Arrested in July, 1900, he was deported with Mabini to
Guam in January, 1901. Ricarte was repatriated in
February, 190 3, aboard the U. S. Army transport Thomas.
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When he refused to take the oath of allegiance to the
United States, he was not allowed to land in the
Philippines, and the Thomas continued on to Hong Kong.
There he associated with the members of the revolu-
2 8tionary committee. Although no organized Junta then
existed, these men eventually formed the Katipunan
Abuluyan , a society based upon the old Katipunan
.
Ricarte was elected president.
In May, 190 3, a stranger named Manuel Ruiz
"Prin" arrived in Hong Kong from Manila, claiming
authority granted by the Filipino people to treat with
foreign powers on independence. Bearing documents and
lists of individuals professing loyalty to the cause,
he proselytized among the Filipinos of the crown
colony. Ricarte, one of his initial recruits, intro-
duced him to others and vouched for his sincerity.
Ricarte and Ruiz discovered that they lived for
a common goal--"to return to the Philippines to revolu-
tionize the country or die in the woods if the country
29did not respond . . . ." In December, 1903, they
formed a committee or Junta called the Universal
Republic of Philippine Dem.ocracy.
Hidden in the hold of the S. S. Yuensang ^ a
Chinese freighter, Ricarte returned to the Philippines
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in December, 1903, successfully avoided the authorities,
and made contact v/ith former insurgents, whom he tried
to recruit. Again and again he was counseled to return
to Hong Kong or to submit to the American authorities.
He was told that "the independence of the country would
be accomplished in three or four years since Taft had
set up the doctrine of 'the Philippines for the
3Filipinos . . . .'" His former comrades in arms
tried to convince him of the futility of restarting the
revolution, with unavoidable bloodshed, especially when
independence was only a few years away. Traveling from
friend to friend, he received essentially the same
answer to his pleas, but he continued to try.
During this time, the Secret Service bureaus of
the Constabulary and City of Manila were hunting
Ricarte. The authorities had knovm Ruiz's and Ricarte's
intentions even in Hong Kong, where they had been
watched carefully. Members of the form.er Junta had been
warned by Apacible, who received word from Manila, that
Ruiz was well known in that city as an irresponsible
individual of anarchistic tendencies . Filipinos kept




Ricarte ' s efforts to raise an army proved
futile, except in the province of Ilocos Sur, where he
attracted a few constabulary soldiers. On April 29,
1904, he was arrested at a cockpit, tried, and sentenced
to six years' imprisonment. He was banished from the
islands in 1910 after again refusing the oath of
31
allegxance. He returned to Hong Kong. This vain
effort to revive the revolution played out the sequel
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In 1859, Sir John Bowring, the governor of Hong
Kong and a recognized expert on the Far East, predicted
after a tour of the Philippines
:
There is no reason to apprehend that these
millions will aspire to political power or
sovereignty [or ever] . . . unite in a
national objective or recognize one native
chief.
1
Less than fifty years later, Bowring 's prophecy
was disproved. The Filipino millions aspired to
political power, the masses united with a common objec-
tive, and they recognized one leader. But the greatest
irony in Bowring 's forecast is that the Philippine
Revolution presaged a movement that would one day sweep
all of Southeast Asia. The dream harbored by a small
group of exiles in Hong Kong proved to be a force
infinitely greater than themselves.
This study has described that Junta with the
purpose of assessing its effect upon Philippine indepen-
dence. Of course, certain events outside of Hong Kong--
such as Filipino activity in Europe, the United States,




In January, 18 98, there •v^;as no defined goal
toward which the Junta could work. The exiles were
skeptical of the Spaniards' good faith; while psycholog-
ically prepared to renew the rebellion, for the moment
they had to be content with waiting and watching.
Aguinaldo, obsessed by his dream of independence, could
not openly advocate this goal so soon after the conclu-
sion of the pact of Biak-na-Bato, but he prepared for
the opportunity.
The Spaniards were mistaken in their assessment
of the situation; their post-pact attitude reflected
pre-insurrection policies. They believed that, with
the voluntary expatriation of the insurgent leaders,
peace would be restored. Only the granting of reforms
could have satisfied the Filipinos. Bad faith was
exhibited by both sides. VJhile Aguinaldo seems to have
expected from the beginning to use the indemnity for
the purchase of arms, the Spaniards never intended to
grant reforms.
The obdurate attitude of the Spaniards towards
reform, and their departure from the agreed-upon
distribution of the indemnity, was all the provocation
the sensitive and anxious exiles needed. They began to
foment revolution with reform as their immediate
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objective. For most of the members of the Junta and
certainly for the Filipino masses, independence was a
concept whose foundation was not firmly laid. More
than three centuries of Spanish rule lay heavy upon the
people. The idea of independence originated with the
Katipunan. It was cherished by Aguinaldo who caused
it to germinate within the Junta and encouraged the
members to adopt it as their goal. Through the efforts
of the exiles , this goal was replanted in the fertile
environment of the Philippines.
In instituting revolt, the Junta was conspic-
uously successful; it organized the people and
eventually, with the Americans, defeated the Spaniards.
Turning against the Americans, the Junta continued to
espouse revolution, until it lost its base of power--
the support of the people.
How did the formation of the Junta facilitate
its purpose? The treaty of Biak-na-Bato provided the
Filipino leadership with an advantageous way out of an
indefensible position. The insurgents were at the end
of their resources, and would soon be compelled to
surrender for lack of arms. This fact was unknown to
the Spaniards, for whom the conflict had become expen-
sive. The Spanish settled for what they considered a
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cheap compromise but one which in the end proved dear to
them. Aguinaldo and his companions left the Philippines
as heroes, with their pride intact, their honor unques-
tioned, and their pockets filled with Spanish gold. The
simultaneous deportation of the revolutionary intellect
to a common place of exile did not eliminate the core of
the insurrectionist movement but merely relocated its
leadership in Hong Kong.
The banishment of the revolutionary chiefs
provided a respite that enabled them to regroup. They
remained intact and organized, their strengths combining
to increase the revolutionary spirit of the whole.
Aguinaldo, the strongest personality in the group,
carried with him to Hong Kong the respect and authority
he had earned on the battlefield. This esteem was
strengthened by the spartan existence he demanded of
himself and others.
Hong Kong provided several advantages. Of all
the possible places of exile, it was the closest
—
approximately two and one half days by steamer from
Manila. It was an international city and major commer-
cial port, an ideal location from which to acquire and
ship arms to the Philippines. As a cosmopolitan center,
it brought the Filipinos into contact with
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representatives of foreign powers. Governed by the
British, the Crown Colony afforded freedom of operation
that was not possible under the oppressive Spanish
administration of the Philippines. Old Filipino sym-
pathizers--expatriates from the 1870s--were prospering
in the city. They provided contacts and financial help
to the newly arrived exiles.
There were also disadvantages with which the
exiles had to cope. Their visibility was relatively
high, for they were foreigners who did not speak the
local language, they were confined to a geographically
small area, and they were unfamiliar with the colony's
laws. These factors made it easy for Spanish agents to
observe them, despite their clandestine and conspir-
atorial activity.
Perhaps the most debilitating feature of the
exiles' existence was their lack of personal contact
with the Filipino masses. A cleavage began upon their
arrival and increased until the Juyita had lost psy-
chological touch with the people by 1901. The physical
isolation of the Junta from the Philippines was accen-
tuated first by the action of the British authorities
and then of the American military.
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The leadership of the Junta resided in
Aguinaldo. Fie was the embodiment of the revolutionary
spirit and, with a singleness of purpose, he directed
the Junta^ s energy towards independence. Despite
allegations of greedy and traitorous intentions, there
can be no doubt that Aguinaldo succeeded in preserving
the Spanish indemnity, securing American aid, and
maintaining the revolutionary integrity of the Junta.
Conversely, the Junta was his support, and individual
members were his confidantes--men such as Filipe
Agoncillo, Teodoro Sandico , J. M. Leyba , and Gregorio
del Pilar. While they did not possess the charismatic
qualities of Aguinaldo, they had keen minds and an
understanding of the world which enabled them to cloak
Aguinaldo 's rustic background with their sophistication,
Their support never wavered, for they recognized in
Aguinaldo that quality of leadership and spark of
greatness necessary to any revolutionary movement. His
faltering or insecurity was observed only by his
closest companions. They buoyed their leader's spirit,
helped him formulate his strategy, and advised and
guided him through the maze of diplomacy. They were
the pillars; he, the foundation.
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Aguinaldo's methods, adopted and enlarged upon
by the Junta ^ were crafty, complex, and brilliant,
involving a spectrum of talents—espionage, diplomacy,
propaganda, murder, bribery, deceit, and forgery.
Justified by the avowed goal of independence for the
Philippines, he saw no tactic as amoral.
Aguinaldo kept tight rein on the Junta and
utilized control over its funds , as well as personal
magnetism, to bind the members to him. He overcame
distractions to individuals generated by isolation and
fed by greed, pride and lust for power.
While the actions of the Spaniards generated a
purpose for the Junta, the goal of independence, kept
alive within Aguinaldo, seemed to become realistic as a
result of the impressions received through consuls
Pratt and V/ildman. No doubt Aguinaldo was initially
convinced that America's interest in the Philippines
was motivated by humanitarian considerations. His
obsession with independence encouraged him to accept
Pratt's vague promises, and he transferred his personal
goal to the Junta, imbuing its members with a greater
sense of direction.
The goal of independence was readily accepted
by the inner circle--those closest to Aguinaldo--but it
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gave rise to suspicion of the United States when
American representatives began to equivocate. The
Junta advised caution in dealing with the Americans and
prepared for a change in United States policy, but the
idea of independence as the ultimate goal remained
rooted strongly.
Prior to Aguinaldo ' s return to Manila, the
Junta members acted with concerted and unselfish zeal,
and remarkable efficiency. They cultivated the support
of the wealthy Filipinos in Hong Kong, overcoming
social disparities .and avoiding basic political
differences. They managed their finances and maintained
a low political profile to avoid antagonizing the
British authorities. By repudiating and replacing the
officials of the provisional government with members of
the Junta., de jure rather then de facto status was
achieved. Contact v;as established with foreign powers.
The Junta accurately assessed the intentions of the
Americans, utilizing the influence of the American
consuls and the resources of the Unites States Navy,
while avoiding disclosure of their true desires.
Circulars were distributed, designed to prepare the
homeland for Aguinaldo 's return and the renewal of the
insurrection. The Junta boldly played both sides,
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simultaneously negotiating with the Spaniards and
Americans. Errors were made, but the Junta took advan-
tage of every opportunity to further the revolutionary
cause, rose above internal problems, and maintained a
united front. This was a most productive period for
the Junta.
With Aguinaldo's departure on May 17, 1898, the
Junta was divested of vitality. The men left behind in
Hong Kong, although generally capable and dedicated,
lacked greatness and were wracked by internal rivalries,
personal greed, and occasional stupidity. Of all the
exiles, Agoncillo was perhaps the most able, but his
rivalry with Sandico detracted from the Junta^s purpose
and threatened its existence. A rift between the
"inner" and "outer" circles sapped the strength of the
organization. Several efforts to procure arms were
mishandled, drained the finances, and raised questions
of reliability. Incurring the ire of the local author-
ities, the Junta did attain a degree of success in its
efforts to procure arms at a time when they were des-
perately needed by Aguinaldo, but ineptness was the
rule.
With the assignment of its most capable men as
agents to foreign countries, and Sandico 's return to
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the Philippines, the Junta^ s role became measurably
less. Although in some instances their efforts were
extraordinary, the agents of the Junta were essentially
unsuccessful in their main attempts to gain recognition.
Aguinaldo therefore conceived new missions for the
Junta: propaganda and intelligence.
Serving as a clearing house for information,
the Junta relayed messages to and from the Philippines,
but not until the declaration of war did the organiza-
tion again become productive. War determined the
course of events; no longer was it necessary to hedge
the propaganda in hopes of recognition.
Shrewdly using Bray's talents, the Junta
achieved notoriety as a propaganda machine. Reports
were often fabricated or exaggerated, but they solic-
ited response. Reports to the Philippines, often
edited to reflect support for the cause of the
Filipinos, projected a feeling of hope--although of
short duration--to the hard-pressed insurgents.
The credibility of the Junta bagan to be ques-
tioned after the American elections of 1900. In the
face of Bryan's defeat, the Junta^ s continued claim of
foreign support for the insurgent cause rang hollow.
The realities of the war were to be found in the
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Philippines; out of communication with Aguinaldo and
losing contact with the populace, the Junta began to
slip into a state of fantasy and impracticality
.
This condition existed more acutely among the
agents abroad , most of whom were appointed from the
Junta. Like Sixto Lopez, they exhibited a tendency
towards grandiose and unrealistic schemes, for they
were out of touch with the homeland and relied upon the
Junta for information and direction. Some, comfortable
in their sanctuaries, urged their countrymen to fight
"to the end, while adding insincere promises to return
to the Philippines to die beside their brothers.
Aguinaldo 's capture heralded not only the end
of the revolution, but also the death of the Junta- He
symbolized the movement , and his oath of allegiance to
the United States signified his acceptance of the
inevitable. Ricarte's attempt to resurrect the Junta
was but a final tremor, for the organization was dead.
The Junta must be recognized as the vehicle
which sustained the revolutionary movement, keeping it
alive by finding external support. Aguinaldo 's leader-
ship was essential to the Junta ' s development and
existence, for he established its purpose and directed
it towards the goal of independence. Although this
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objective was not realized, the Junta was instrumental
in making it a national aspiration. The impetus
generated by this band of men changed the course of
Filipino history, bound its fate to that of the United
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The purpose of this thesis is to trace the
origin, evolution, and fate of an obscure organization
that emerged during the Philippine Revolution, a group
known as the Hong Kong Junta. The Junta's successes
and failures are analyzed within the context of the
Filipinos' quest for independence.
The signing of the pact of Biak-na-Bato in
December, 1897, signaled the end of the first phase of
the Philippine Rev,alution., Aguinaldo a.i^ other revolu-
tionary leaders were exiled by the Spaniards to Hong
Kong, where they formed their revolutionary committee.
The study begins with an examination of the social and
political forces motivating the Junta's formation in
1898, and follows its struggles to its demise in 1903.
The primary sources used in this study are
microfilmed and translated copies of material found in
the Philippine Insurgent Records , in the custody of the
National Library of the Philippines. Extensive use was
also made of United States government documents, partic-
ularly consular despatches. Senate documents, and
Congressional records, which provided a wealth of
translated Spanish and Filipino documents. Memoirs of
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revolutionary personalities, although ancillary, proved
helpful in determining the mood and direction of the
revolutionary movement. Whenever possible, opposing
viewpoints--Filipino, American, Spanish--were compared.
On the basis of the research, it was determined
that the Junta linked the two phases of the revolution--
Spanish and American. Under the leadership of
Aguinaldo, the Junta effected an alliance leading to the
downfall of Spanish colonialism in the Philippines, and
subsequently involved the Filipino people in a brave
but hopeless struggle against "the bYiited- States .
During the insurrection, the Junta achieved notoriety
for its successful propaganda campaign but, despite
individual successes, the organization failed to
achieve its primary goal--Philippine independence. In
retrospect, however, the Junta did not fail, for it
transmitted to the Philippines and instilled in the
populace the desire for independence--a goal that
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